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Delivering Due Process and Procedural Efficiency at Low Cost: 
The Grail Quest of International Online Arbitration 
Josh B. Martin* 
Abstract 
Designing an online arbitration procedure which delivers the cornerstone requirements of 
efficiency, value and fairness has been described as the ‘grail quest’ for online dispute 
resolution (ODR). Focusing on the incipient global legal framework for both business-to-
consumer (B2C) and business-to-business (B2B) arbitration, this paper explores whether 
current due process or consumer protection laws might be preventing the creation of an 
international system of binding low-value online ODR.  Intending to stimulate innovation in 
this nascent industry, evaluation is made of the unsuccessful efforts to develop a 
transnational online arbitration model at the United Nations Commission on Trade Law, the 
newly launched European Union online dispute resolution platform, and the extant Uniform 
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy.   
Through comparison of EU and US approaches to mandatory consumer arbitration clauses, 
it questions whether such clauses would need to become enforceable ex ante before an 
international consumer arbitration system can ever be fully fledged.  It also explores the 
minimum procedural requirements for low-value B2B and B2C arbitration and, as such, may 
be of great interest to dispute resolution entrepreneurs, professionals and regulators wishing 
to capitalise on the growing millions of high-volume low-value cross-border legal claims not 
being internally managed by online intermediaries or service providers.  By reviewing 
various developments in the industry, such as fast-track arbitration and consumer ODR 
systems, it will attempt to resolve the ever-present dilemma of maintaining each fairness and 
efficiency within an affordable and expedient online arbitration process.  Naturally, 
therefore, various elements of online arbitration procedural design are closely examined, 
appraising matters such as documents-only hearings, fees & funding, document disclosure, 
time limits, transparency, award reasoning and applicable law. 
I. Introduction 
The need for an international framework to provide redress for low-value cross-border 
disputes through online arbitration is now well accepted.  Research continues to confirm that 
while ecommerce is growing healthily worldwide, the percentage of ecommerce sales 
actually being cross-border is actually reducing, primarily from a lack of consumer 
confidence over opportunities for redress.1  At the United Nations Commission for 
                                                            
* Josh B. Martin, University of Exeter Law School, United Kingdom, J.B.Martin@exeter.ac.uk 
1 Commission of the European Communities, Report on Cross-Border E-Commerce in the EU, (2009), Working 
Document SEC 283, Brussels, 26 (http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_research/market_studies/docs/ 
com_staff_wp2009_en.pdf;  According to eMarketer, global e-ecommerce sales are currently valued at around 
$1.95 trillion and are estimated to exceed $4 trillion by 2020, 22nd August 2016 (www.emarketer.com/ 
Article/Worldwide-Retail-Ecommerce-Sales-Will-Reach-1915-Trillion-This-Year/1014369); Galves, F.,  
“Virtual Justice as Reality: Making the Resolution of E-Commerce Disputes More Convenient, Legitimate, 
Efficient and Secure”,  (2009), University of Illinois Journal of Law Technology & Policy 1, 3; EU Commission, 
Memorandum - Frequently Asked Questions: The Review of EU Consumer Protection Rules “The Review of the 
Consumer Acquis”, (2007), MEMO/07/48 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-07-48_en.htm) 
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International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) a Working Group on Online Dispute Resolution 
spent many years attempting to craft an international solution, through the development of 
recommended institutional rules for online dispute resolution (ODR) providers.  Eventually, 
despite years of concerted effort, this ambitious undertaking proved unsuccessful given the 
amount of time it was taking to achieve consensus on numerous elements of online arbitral 
procedure.  In Europe, however, the European Union (EU) has managed to launch its own 
Online Dispute Resolution Platform (ODR Platform) in February 2016. 
This paper will explore UNCITRAL’s efforts, between 2010-2016, to make such low-value 
arbitrations enforceable through the widely ratified 1958 UNCITRAL New York Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Awards (“New York Convention”).2  
Questioning, in particular, whether the due process safeguards – providing for a 
fundamentally fair arbitration procedure – are sufficient under the New York Convention in 
the context of low-value contract claims and, if they are not, what the alternative solutions 
could be.  It further questions the consumer protection principle of ensuring consumers retain 
the option whether or not to be bound by pre-dispute arbitration clauses.  Or whether, if 
neither party is compelled into binding arbitration by pre-dispute agreements, there is ever 
likely to be a successful online arbitration framework. 
Assuming that a level of harmonisation is needed at the international level to compel both 
merchant and consumer into a binding online dispute resolution process, this paper will then 
question whether pre-dispute agreements could be made enforceable.  Based on research 
across the commercial and consumer arbitration, as well as ODR disciplines, it first evaluates 
from a theoretical and then a practical viewpoint, how parties in low-value should be 
provided with procedural fairness, accounting for the fact that many will lack effective 
bargaining power, while also ensuring that the arbitration process remains cheap and 
expedient.  It will address various procedural elements of online arbitration, including 
restrictive time limits, applicable law, document disclosure, fees & funding, arbitrator and 
ODR provider appointment, class actions, agreement & award form, award reasoning and 
rules on ODR provider transparency.  It asks whether, given the lack of any alternative means 
of redress, we may need to accept a diminished role for “truth-seeking” within any low-value 
arbitration process and will instead need to focus on recalibrating party bargaining 
inequalities.  Finally, it shows that given the overriding objective of maintaining a fast and 
quick arbitration process, there will likely be a diminished role for party and arbitrator 
procedural autonomy in acquiescence to pre-determined institutional controls.  Overall, the 
paper provides inspiration and guidance to aspiring dispute resolution professionals and 
entrepreneurs wishing to capitalise on the growing number of high-volume low-value cross-
border claims that do not fit comfortably with the expensive and time-consuming traditional 
international commercial arbitration model. 
II. Minimum Due Process in International Arbitration 
‘Due process’ is a broad phrase denoting the requirement for a fundamentally fair procedure 
in any legal adjudicatory process.  In international arbitration it “is often understood as a 
‘hard’ rule of law, a kind of … foundation of all other procedural rules, the violation or 
disregard of which will lead to unenforceability of the award.”3  Thus it operates at both the 
                                                            
2 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, (New York, June 
1958) 
3 Strong, S. I., (2008), “Enforcing Class Arbitration in the International Sphere: Due Process and Public Policy 
Concerns”, 30 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 1, 55; Magnusson, A., (2008), “Fast 
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seat of arbitration and at the stage of cross-border enforcement to provide minimum 
procedural protections working to uphold the legitimacy of the arbitral process and to prevent 
the attachment of legal force to arbitrations that are intrinsically unfair.  Given the 
transnationality of cross-border dispute resolution and the varying types of cross-border 
claims, its exact definition and details are never precise and can be subject to variation.4  In 
this sense it has been described as “elastic”,5 “elusive”,6 and “flexible”,7 moulding itself to fit 
each particular case. 
The phrase itself has been adopted into the international context from similar wording in 
common law civil procedure.  However, every other nation has similar doctrines such as 
natural justice in the United Kingdom, procedural fairness and the commonly held notion of 
principle de la contradiction in civil jurisdictions.8  Across the various judicial and academic 
efforts to summarise the basic tenets of due process in international commercial arbitration, 
there are two common and recurring principles, being the opportunity to present one’s case 
and equality between the parties.9  Kaufmann-Kohler also highlights how increasingly the 
concept of procedural efficiency is also being regarded as a potential due process principle, 
but that it has not achieved the same recognition as the other principles.10  Furthermore, 
increasing reference is being made to a concept of international due process.  Much like 
transnational public policy, it is in effect minimum principles of procedural law which are 
commonly found across the world’s legal systems and which comprise of the most 
fundamental notions of fair procedure.11   The ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational 
Civil Procedure, which were drafted as a soft law codification of principles forming 
minimum “standards for adjudication of transnational commercial disputes” is an important 
piece of comparative research in this field.12  The guide highlights several key procedural 
principles which could be considered pertinent to any fair adjudicative procedure, including 
the “independence” and “impartiality” of the judges,13 jurisdiction over the parties,14 and 
procedural equality of the parties.15  It also determined that judgments cannot be made 
without due process of law which includes “effective…notice” and “right to submit relevant 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Track Arbitration: The SCC Experience”, Summary of Mrs Magnusson's speech at the Introduction to 
Arbitration seminar held in Stockholm on 13 - 16 June, 2001, 5 (http://sccinstitute.com/media/56055/fast_track_ 
arbitration.pdf) 
4 Kaufmann-Kohler, G., (2003), “Globalization of Arbitral Procedure”, 36 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational 
Law 1313, 1322; Protopsaltou, D., Schultz T., & Magnenat-Thalmann, N., (2006), “Taking the Fourth Party 
Further? Considering a shared virtual workspace for arbitration”, 15 Information & Communications 
Technology Law 157, 168; Kurkela, M. & Turunen, S., (2010), Due Process in International Commercial 
Arbitration, 2nd Ed, Oxford University Press, 7-8 
5 International Law Association, (2008), International Commercial Arbitration: Final Report on Ascertaining 
the Contents of the Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration, Rio De Janeiro Conference, 20 
6 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960), 442 (US) 
7 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), 481 (US) 
8 Supra n4 Kaufmann-Kohler, 1321-1322 
9 Waincymer J., (2012), Procedure and Evidence in International Arbitration, Kluwer Law International, 16; 
Mohtashami, R., (2009), Due Process in International Arbitration: Transcripts, at International Bar Association 
12th Annual Conference 2009, 97; Supra n4 Kurkela & Turunen, 185; 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law of 
International Commercial Arbitration, Last Amended 2006, (“UNCITRAL Model Law”), Article 18 
10 Supra n4 Kaufmann-Kohler, 1321-1322 
11 Carodine, M.D., (2006), “Political Judging: When Due Process Goes International”, 48 William and Mary 
Law Review 1159 
12 ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, adopted by UNIDROIT Governing Council in 
2004, (http://unidroit.org/instruments/transnational-civil-procedure) 
13 ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, Principle 1 
14 ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, Principle 2 
15 ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, Principle 3 
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contentions of law and fact and to offer supporting evidence”.16  This therefore forms an 
excellent starting point from which to gain a basic understanding of some common principles 
of due process.17 
It could be said that the fluidity of due process serves to raise the level of due process based 
on the relative political or public value of the case in hand: It is logical and perhaps obvious 
that the level of due process required in a war crimes trial should be different to that in a low-
value consumer warranty dispute.18  Given the overpowering role of party autonomy and the 
parties’ freedom to privately contract for almost anything, as well as the pro-enforcement bias 
of the New York Convention, the level of due process required in international commercial 
arbitration is accordingly far less than that compared with other civil or criminal procedures 
in public courts.19  It is thus fundamental to note that “the emphasis during an enforcement 
action is on whether the process was proper and in accordance with the arbitration 
agreement, not whether the result and procedure would have been the same under the law 
and procedure of the enforcing state.”20  Instead, the New York Convention calls for an 
almost commonsensical approach, using “limited, standard and uniform standards” and only 
sanctioning “very serious irregularities,”21 which clearly impact on the case outcome,22 
based on the courts own rationalisation of what is fundamentally unfair.  It is thus an 
incredibly narrow protection, mostly concerned with seeking out clear-cut cases of flagrancy, 
corruption or bias.23  This minimal protection is based on the contractual freedom of 
arbitration’s customers to waive various procedural rights.24  Indeed, if the parties are truly 
                                                            
16 ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, Principle 5 
17 Kotuby, C.T., (2013), “General Principles of Law, International Due Process, and the Modern Role of Private 
International Law”, 23 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 411, 428 
18 Park, W.W., (2010), “Arbitrators and Accuracy”, 1 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 25, 34; 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), 334 (US) 
19 Yves Fortier, L., (1999), “The Minimum Requirements of Due Process in Taking Measures Against Dilatory 
Tactics: Arbitral Discretion in International Commercial Arbitration – A Few Plain Rules and a Few Strong 
Instincts”, in Improving Efficiency of Arbitration Agreements and Awards: 40 Years of Application of the New 
York Convention, (van den Berg, A.J., Ed.), ICCA Congress Series No.9, Kluwer Law International, 398; 
International Law Association, Final Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral 
Awards, New Delhi Conference, (2002), (available at www.ila-hq.org) 
20 Supra n3 Strong, 91-92; Supra n9 Waincymer, 28; Wetter, J.G., (1985), “The Conduct of Arbitration”, 2 
Journal of International Arbitration 33 
21 Poudret, J. & Besson, S., (2007), Comparative Law of International Arbitration, 2nd Ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 
818-820 
22 Welser, I. & Klausegger, C., (2009), “Fast-Track Arbitration: Just Fast or Something Different?”, in Austrian 
Arbitration Yearbook 2009, Manzsche Verlags, 270; Caprasse, O., (2010), “Arbitrability, due process and public 
policy in set aside proceedings”, in Arbitration News, Newsletter of the International Bar Association Legal 
Practice Division, Vol 15(1), 113-114 
23 Gharavi, H., (2009), Due Process in International Arbitration: Transcripts, at International Bar Association 
12th Annual Conference 2009, 128; De Boisséson, M., (2007), “New Tensions between Arbitrators and Parties 
in the Conduct of Arbitral Procedure”, 10 International Arbitration Law Review 177, 179 - The violation of the 
French law, for example, must be “flagrant, effective and concrete” & United States courts often expect a 
“substantial injustice or prejudice”; Supra n4 Kurkela & Turunen, 37 – Essentially calls to “truly international 
due process requirements” 
24 Supra n9 Waincymer, 80; Böckstiegel, K.H., (1997), “The Role of Party Autonomy in International 
Arbitration” 52 Dispute Resolution Journal 24, 25; Supra n4 Kaufmann-Kohler, 1322; Carbonneau, T.E., 
(2003), “The Exercise of Contract Freedom in the Making of Arbitration Agreements”, 36 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 1189, 1192-1193 
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concerned about any specific higher level due process rights, there is nothing to prevent them 
from negotiating them into the procedural construction.25   
It is also important to remember how differing legal cultures can very heavily impact on the 
definition of due process.  A well-known example is the differing attitudes towards document 
discovery as a due process right in common and civil law countries.26  Similarly, Nariman 
calls us to recognise that our Western concepts of due process are different from the East, 
such as in Korea or Japan, where the majority of disputes are resolved through mediation and 
conciliation, rather than the “adversarial” style familiar to the West.27  Thus, determining a 
static and readily accessible set of transnational due process principles is incredibly difficult, 
for it is highly contextual and circumstantial.28  Kurkela has further highlighted how national 
laws regulating arbitral due process are a difficult starting point from which to derive a 
definition, for many national due process laws are purposefully defined in a vague and 
“open” manner providing greater interpretative discretion, plus many jurisdictions have 
conflicting views on whether certain procedural rules are mandatory or non-mandatory.29  
Nevertheless, the same overwhelming deference to party agreement is patently clear in all 
national laws regulating international arbitration.30  For example, most of the rules within the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (UNCITRAL Model Law) 
are subject to party autonomy, save for a small fraction of mandatory rules.31  Even Article 19 
dealing with the “admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence” is subject 
to control by the parties. Thus, the due process “minimums” within international arbitration 
are, as a result of freedom of contract, exceptionally minimal.   
Under the New York Convention, which commonly controls cross-border enforcement of 
arbitration agreements and awards, Article V(1)(b) is perhaps the most regularly cited article 
in reference to due process.  It holds that recognition and enforcement of an arbitration may 
be refused if the party against whom it is invoked can provide proof that he “was not given 
proper notice of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case.”  
There has been some confusion amongst courts and commentators as to which due process 
laws and values they should be considering when making a ruling: is it the forum’s laws on 
due process or the law at the place of arbitration?32  The majority - and correct – view, based 
                                                            
25 Supra n9 Waincymer, 4; Lévy, L., (2009), Due Process in International Arbitration: Transcripts, at 
International Bar Association 12th Annual Conference 2009, 65  
26 Clermont, K.M. & Sherwin, E., (2002), “A Comparative View of Standards of Proof”, 50 American Journal 
of Comparative Law 243; Lind, E.A., Erickson, B.E., Friedland N. & Dickenberger, M., (1978), “Reactions to 
Procedural Models for Adjudicative Conflict Resolution: A Cross-National Study”, 22 Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 318 
27 Nariman, F., (2009), Due Process in International Arbitration: Transcripts, at International Bar Association 
12th Annual Conference 2009, 238 
28 O'Hare, J., (1996), “The Denial of Due Process and the Enforceability of CIETAC Awards Under the New 
York Convention: the Hong Kong Experience”, 13 Journal of International Arbitration 179, 184 
29 Supra n4 Kurkela & Turunen, 2; Supra n19 Yves Fortier, 398 
30 Kronke, H., Nacimiento, P., Otto, D. & Port, N.C., (2011), Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards: A Global Commentary on the New York Convention, Kluwer Law International, 240; Pryles, M., 
(1997), “Limits to Party Autonomy in Arbitral Procedure”, 24 Journal of International Arbitration 327, 321-323; 
Blackaby, N., Partasides, C., Redfern A. & Hunter M., (2009), Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration 
– Student Version, 5th Ed, Oxford University Press, 3.45; Supra n24 Carbonneau, 1217 
31 One such mandatory rule is suggested to be Article 18 which requires procedural equality and a full 
opportunity for parties to present their case – Ibid., Pryles, 29; Holtzmann, H.M. & Neuhaus, J.E., (1995), A 
Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: Legislative History and 
Commentary, Kluwer Law International, 583 
32 Supra n3 Strong, 63-64, 89; Supra n28 O'Hare; Supra n30 Kronke et al, 237-240  
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on a reading of the New York Convention, is that when considering Article V(1)(b) the 
enforcing court should apply its own notions of due process.33   
The ability to present one’s case is also a common mandatory rule within most national 
arbitration laws34 and at least to some it “appears to be the most fundamental due process 
rule.”35  Certainly in the United States, the most fundamental requirement of procedural due 
process is “the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”36  
Mantilla-Serrano informs us that this principle includes receiving proper notice of each 
relevant stage, being given a reasonable time and opportunity to respond, and respecting the 
general right to an adversarial proceeding.37  As a principle it is purposefully vague38 and 
what is a sufficient level of “opportunity” can be explicated in the law governing the 
arbitration at the seat,39 although widely it is expected that the arbitrator ultimately decides 
which evidence needs to be heard or which evidence is only going to unnecessarily delay or 
increase the cost of the arbitration.40  At its core, however, parties must be kept informed at 
every stage of the proceedings41 and must be given an opportunity to refute any evidence that 
is raised in the process.42 
                                                            
33 This is made even more clear by the fact that Article V(1)(d), handling the composition of the tribunal and 
design of the procedure, explicitly refers to the arbitration laws at the seat of arbitration; Parsons & Whittemore 
Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale De L'industrie Du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (1974), (US), 975-976 
– Article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention “essentially sanctions the application of the forum state's 
standards of due process”; Inoue, O., (2000), “The Due Process Defense to Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards in United States Federal Courts: A Proposal for a Standard”, 11 American Review of 
International Arbitration 247; Supra  n11 Carodine, 1226; Jiangsu Changlong Chem. Co. v. Burlington Bio-
Med. & Sci. Corp., 399 F. Supp. 2d 165 (2005), 168 (US) 
34 Eg Article 18 UNCITRAL Model Law; Article 1042(1) Deutsche Zivilprozeßordnung (ZPO); Article 1485 
French Code of Civil Procedure; Chapter 609(46) Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance; Section 33 English 
Arbitration Act; 24(2) Arbitration (Scotland) Act - Schedule I 
35 Supra n4 Kurkela & Turunen, 38 
36 City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715 (2003), 717 (US); International Transactions, Ltd. v. 
Embotelladora Agral Regiomontana, SA de CV, 347 F.3d 589 (2003), 594 (US); Harding, M.M., (2004), “The 
Limits of Due Process Protocols”, 19 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 369, 393 
37 Mantilla-Serrano, F., (2004), “Towards a Transnational Procedural Public Policy”, 20 Arbitration 
International 342 
38 Supra n4 Kurkela & Turunen, 37 
39 Distinguish for example Section 33 of English Arbitration Act 1996 which calls for a “reasonable” 
opportunity with Article 18 UNCITRAL Model Law which requires a “full” opportunity; Lew, J., Mistelis, L. & 
Kröll, S., (2003), Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer Law International, Para. 26-87; 
Supra n23 De Boisséson, 178 
40 Supra n30 Kronke et al, 250; Supra n22 Welser & Klausegger, 267; Park, W.W., (2004), “Arbitration’s 
Protean Nature: The Value of Rules and the Risks of Discretion”, 19 Mealey’s International Arbitration Report 
1, 4-5; Supra n9 Mohtashami, 103-104; Generica Ltd. v. Pharmaceutical Basics, Inc., 125 F.3d 1123, (1997), 
1130 (US); Killam v. Brander Smith [1997] BCJ No 456, paras 14-15 (Canada); OLG Hamburg, (6th September 
1984), Docket No. 6 U 50/84, 31 RIW 490 (1985) (Germany); OGH, (27th November 1991), Docket No. 3 Ob 
1091/91, 33 ZfRV 309 (1992) (Austria); OLG Köln, Docket No. 9 Sch 01-03, (April 3rd 2004), XXX Yearbook 
Commercial Arbitration 560 (2005) (Germany); U. v. Epoux G., ATF 117 II 346 (1st July 1991) / BULL. ASA 
415 (1991) (Switzerland); Sheet Metal Workers International Association v. Kinney Air Conditioning Co., 756 
F.2d 742 (1985), 744 (US); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Air Florida System, Inc., 822 F.2d 833 
(1987), 842 (US); Note, for example, how Section 33 of English Arbitration Act 1996 calls for opportunity to 
present case while also adopting “procedures suitable to the circumstances of the particular case, avoiding 
unnecessary delay or expense” 
41 van den Berg, A.J., (2007), “New York Convention of 1958: Refusals of Enforcement”, 18 ICC International 
Court of Arbitration Bulletin 1, 20; Guang Dong Light Headgear Factory Co. v. ACI International, Inc., (10th 
May 2005), XXXI Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 1105 (2006), 1118 (US); Russian Seller v. German Buyer, 
(16th March 2000) XXVII Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 445 (2002) (Germany); Buyer v. Seller, (10th June 
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The other common due process requirement of equality between the parties usually derives 
from mandatory rules of the lex loci arbitri.43  This principle does not mean that the parties 
need to be treated identically,44 but that both parties should be treated in a way that does not 
disadvantage them in the circumstances.  Such as requiring that the arbitrators are not biased 
through a conflict of interest.  However, again the interpretation here is very narrow.45  For 
example, national courts have interpreted that the arbitrator must have ‘actual bias’, rather 
than an ‘appearance of bias’.46  Finally, two other New York Convention articles are 
regularly cited in reference to due process.  Article V(1)(d) of the New York Convention 
which calls for conformity with party agreement is also extremely narrow in application and 
rarely ever succeeds as a defence.47  It is generally agreed that if parties do not object at any 
point during the arbitration, they are estopped from claiming a breach of their agreement at 
the courts.48  Finally, Article V(2)(b) provides the notorious catch-all public policy defence to 
enforcement, although it is widely accepted that procedural public policy commonly 
encapsulates and overlaps with the other due process defences.49 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
1976), IV Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 258 (1979) (Germany); Firm P v. Firm F, (3rd April 1975), II 
Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration 241 (1977) (Germany) 
42 'Ière Cour de droit civil, 4P.4/2007, (26th September 2007), 26 ASA Bulletin, (2007), 151 (Switzerland); Cour 
de Cassation, (14th March 2006), Revue d’Arbitrage, (2006), 653 (France); Company A v. Trustee in Bankruptcy 
of Company X, Docket No. 12 0 184/1981, (20th January 1986), XII Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 486 
(1987) (Germany); Firm P v. Firm F, (3rd April 1975), II Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration 241 (1977) 
(Germany); Chrome Resources S.A. v. Léopold Lazarus Ltd., (8th February 1978), XI Yearbook Commercial 
Arbitration 541 (1986) (Switzerland); Supra n41 van den Berg, 20 
43 Article 18 UNCITRAL Model Law - "the parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given 
a full opportunity of presenting his case"; Article 33 English Arbitration Act 1996 - “[The tribunal shall] act 
fairly and impartially as between the parties, giving each party a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and 
dealing with that of his opponent” 
44 Supra n9 Waincymer, 16-17, 19; Supra n4 Kurkela & Turunen, 190 
45 Supra n30 Kronke et al, 282-283, 388-391; Supra n4 Kurkela & Turunen, 29; Per Lord Wilberforce in Calvin 
v. Carr [1980] All ER 440 (PC) – “While flagrant cases of injustice, including corruption or bias, must always 
be firmly dealt with by the courts, the tendency … should be to leave these to be settled by the agreed methods 
without requiring the formalities of judicial processes to be introduced.” 
46 AT&T Corporation v. Saudi Cable Company [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 625 (England & Wales); 
Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart, (18th October 1999) and Dutch Shipowner v. German Cattle and Meat Dealer, (1st 
February 2001), XXIX Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 700-714 (2004) (Germany); United States, Southern 
District Court of New York, (27th June 2003) and Lucent Technologies Inc., et al. v. Tatung Co., (3rd August 
2004)  XXX Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 747-761 (2005) (US); Gao Haiyan and another v Keeneye 
Holdings Ltd and another [2012] 1 HKC 335 (Hong Kong) 
47 Compagnie des Bauxites de Guine´e v. Hammermills Inc., 1992 WL 122712 (1992) (US) – Only those 
violations of agreed rules that work “substantial prejudice to the complaining party” are covered by Article 
V(1)(d); China Agribusiness Development Corporation v. Balli Trading [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 76 (England & 
Wales); Supra n3 Strong, 70; Supra n21 Poudret & Besson, 892; Choi, S., (1995-1996), “Judicial Enforcement 
of Arbitration Awards under the ICSID and New York Convention”, 28 New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 175, 189 
48 International Standard Electric Corp. (ISEC) v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Industrial Y 
Commercial 745 F. Supp. 172 (1990), 180 (US); Supra n25 Lévy, 68 
49 Harris, T.L., (2007), “The ‘Public Policy’ Exception to Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards 
Under the New York Convention: With Particular Reference to Construction Disputes”, 24 Journal of 
International Arbitration 9, 10, 17; Italian Party v. Swiss Co., XXIX Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 819 
(2004), 829 (Switzerland); Supra n19 Final Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International 
Arbitral Awards, Para. 29; Supra n39 Lew et al, Para. 26-117 – “possible procedural public policy grounds 
include fraud in the composition of the tribunal; breach of natural justice; lack of impartiality; lack of reasons 
in the award; manifest disregard of the law; manifest disregard of the facts; annulment at place of arbitration.”  
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It is apparent on a review the very few cases that have succeeded in setting aside or avoiding 
enforcement through a due process argument, that unfairness usually requires that the 
dissatisfied party was not in control of the unfair portion of the procedure.50  A well known 
case for example is Iran Aircraft Industries v. Avco Corp.51  Here a change in the 
composition of the tribunal meant that Avco were effectively misled on the level of detail 
they needed to provide in their evidence.52  Similarly, in another case, a party could not argue 
that their rights had been breached when an inspection was held in their absence, because 
they had been informed of the inspection and did not request another one with them present.53  
Very often, therefore, a party cannot claim a due process breach for their own failure to 
attend or object to any aspect of the procedure,54 even in one case where non-attendance was 
outside of their control but could be remedied by sending a proxy.55 
In summary, the New York Convention, the institutional rules and the national laws all 
regulating international arbitration have been drafted in light of the fact that the vast majority 
of international arbitration’s customers are commercial parties of roughly equal bargaining 
power and often possessing the financial resource to invest in proficient legal advice and 
representation.56  They therefore pay a significant level of deference to party autonomy and to 
their freedom to devise their own procedure, fair or unfair, providing only the absolute 
minimum in due process protections.  As Lévy has said of its due process, “it is not anything 
goes, but it is almost anything goes.”57   As a result, the procedural construction within 
commercial arbitration is usually left to ingenuity of both the arbitral tribunal and parties 
working synergistically and creatively, with a fair amount of reference to soft principles58 
which “arbitrators are free to ignore and often do”,59 as well as to the arbitrators’ and 
parties’ own experience and intelligence.60  This makes sense where parties of equal 
                                                            
50 Supra n41 
51 Iran Aircraft Industries v. Avco Corporation, 980 F.2d 141 (1992), 146 (US) 
52 Supra n33 Inoue, 255 
53 Hebei Import and Export Corporation v. Polytek Engineering Company Limited, (9th February 1999) XXIV 
Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 652 (1999) (Hong Kong) 
54 Supra n30 Kronke et al, 253; Supra n33 Inoue (2000), 249-250; Orion Pictures Corporation v. Writers Guild 
of America, West Incorporated, 946 F.2d 722 (1991), 723 (US); Val-U Construction Company v. Rosebud Sioux 
Tribe, 146 F.3d 573 (1998), 577-580 (US); Bernstein Seawell & Kove v. Borsage, 813 F.2d 726 (1987), 729-730 
(US); Swiss Federal Tribunal [1980] SJ 65 (8th February 1979) (Switzerland); C v. Dr. Vladimir Z, OGH, (21st 
March 2005) XXXI Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 583 (2006) (Austria); Norbrook Laboratories v. A Tank 
and Moulson [2006] WL 1333300 (Comm) (England & Wales) 
55 Consorcio Rive, SA de CV v Briggs of Cancun Inc, 134 F. Supp. 2d 789 (2001), 796 (US) 
56 Shell, R., (1988), “The Role of Public Law in Private Dispute Resolution: Reflections on Shearson/American 
Express, Inc. v McMahon”, 26 American Business Law Journal 397, 418-419; Drahozal, C.R., (2001), “’Unfair’ 
Arbitration Clauses”, University of Illinois Law Review 695, 700-703; Rutledge, P.B., (2007), "Who Can Be 
against Fairness - The Case against the Arbitration Fairness Act", 9 Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 267, 
270 
57 Supra n25 Lévy, 70; Also Team Design v. Gottlieb, 104 S.W.3d 512 (2002), 518 (United States, Tennessee 
Court of Appeal) – suggesting that as long as they are agreed to by competent parties who are "dealing at arm's 
length," even procedures such as "flipping a coin, or, for that matter, arm wrestling" will be upheld 
58 Supra n4 Kurkela & Turunen, 7-8; Examples include the UNCITRAL Notes on Organising Arbitral 
Proceedings; the International Bar Association’s Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Commercial 
Arbitration, International Bar Association’s Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration; and 
the International Arbitration Committee of the ICC Report ‘Techniques for Controlling Time and Costs in 
Arbitration’ (ICC Publication No. 843, 2007) 
59 Supra n40 Park, 8 
60 Supra n19 Yves Fortier, 401; Supra n23 De Boisséson, 180; Rau, A.S., (2008), “Arbitral Jurisdiction and the 
Dimensions of Consent,” 24 Arbitration International 199, 204 
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bargaining power each have the ability to influence the procedural design.  However, it 
makes little sense within international ultra-low-value arbitration where – given the regular 
inequality of bargaining power, the regularity of small-print contract terms, and the potential 
for pre-designed arbitration agreements hidden within boilerplate terms – there is little 
opportunity for the consumer to “negotiate” on procedure or, thus, to introduce due process 
safeguards.61   
III. Unpacking Consumer Online Arbitration 
a) Online consumer arbitration 
Over the past two decades there has been an abundance of literature discussing the various 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of dispute resolution processes in cyberspace 
such as online arbitration, mediation and software-assisted negotiation.62  The increasing 
concern over the millions of often low-value contractual arising across borders, as a result of 
ever-increasing levels of cross-border ecommerce, has understandably driven this 
commitment to developing an international framework to support low-value claims through 
ODR.63  The difficulty of pursuing cross-border consumer and low-value trade claims 
through traditional court procedures is well accepted64 and the costs of conducting cross-
border dispute resolution through ODR are likely to be a fraction by comparison.65  This 
makes “ODR not so much an option, as the only option”66 for low-value disputes, where the 
average value of a dispute in the consumer context, at least, is estimated to be around $146.67  
Therefore, the academic and professional community, as well as UNCITRAL, OECD and the 
                                                            
61 Hörnle, J., (2009), Cross-Border Internet Dispute Resolution, Cambridge University Press, 128; Supra n4 
Kurkela & Turunen, 54-56; Supra n9 Waincymer, 15; Gibbons, L.J., (2002), "Creating a Market for Justice; A 
Market Incentive Solution to Regulating the Playing Field: Judicial Deference, Judicial Review, Due Process, 
and Fair Play in Online Consumer Arbitration", 23 Newark Journal of International Law & Business 1, 62; 
Cortés, J. & de la Rosa, F.E., (2013), “Building a Global Redress System for Low-Value Cross-Border 
Disputes”, 62 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 407, 410; Rogers, C.A., (2007), “The Arrival of 
the Have-Nots in International Arbitration”, 8 Nevada Law Journal 341, 341 
62 See in particular the Symposium on Online Dispute Resolution from the University of Toledo Law Review 
(Volume 38), especially Katsh, E. & Wing, L., “Ten Years of Online Dispute Resolution (ODR): Looking at the 
Past and Constructing the Future”, (2006), 38 University of Toledo Law Review 19; Haloush, H.A. & Malkawi, 
B.H., “Internet Characteristics and Online Alternative Dispute Resolution”, (2008), 13 Harvard Negotiation 
Law Review 327; Ahalt, A.M.M, “What You Should Know About Online Dispute Resolution”, (2009), March 
2009 Practical Litigator 21; Friedman, G.H., “Alternative Dispute Resolution and Emerging Online 
Technologies: Challenges and Opportunities”, (1997), 19 Hastings Communications & Entertainment Law 
Journal 695 
63 Supra n1 
64 Patrikios, A., “The Role of Transnational Online Arbitration in Regulating Cross-Border e-Business – Part I”, 
(2008), 24 Computer Law and Security Report 66, 68-69; Rule, C. Del Duca, L. & Rogers, V., “Designing a 
Global Consumer Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) System for Cross-Border Small Value-High Volume 
Claims—OAS Developments”, (2010), 42 Uniform Commercial Code Law Journal 221, 226, 228; Riefa, C. & 
Hörnle, J., “The Changing Face of Electronic Consumer Contracts in the Twenty-first Century: Fit for 
Purpose?”, (2009), in Law and the Internet, 3rd Ed., (Edwards, L. & Waelde, C.,Eds.), Hart Publishing, 102-17 
65 Hörnle, J., “The Jurisdictional Dilemma of the Internet”, (2009), in Law and the Internet, 3rd Ed., (Edwards, 
L. & Waelde, C., Eds.), Hart Publishing, 153-154; Rabinovich-Einy, O., “Balancing the Scales: The Ford-
Firestone Case, the Internet, and the Future Dispute Resolution Landscape”, (2003), 6 Yale Journal of Law & 
Technology 1, 22 
66 Stylianou, P., “Online Dispute Resolution: The Case for a Treaty Between the United States and the European 
Union in Resolving Cross-Border e-Commerce Disputes”, (2008), 36 Syracuse Journal of International Law & 
Commerce 117, 123-124 
67 Gilliéron, P., “From Face-to-Face to Screen-to-Screen: Real Hope or True Fallacy?”, (2008), 23 Ohio State 
Journal on Dispute Resolution 301, 302 
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EU, have all been pressing for such a system, stressing that low consumer and business 
confidence in purchasing goods and services from overseas is inhibiting the development of 
ecommerce and industry, adversely impacting on the global economy.68  However, although 
“much has been written about what an ODR system should look like, the question of how any 
such system would be implemented remains problematic.”69 
After a series of consultations and Green Papers,70 in 2007 the EU set about its plans to create 
a Europe-wide system to provide e-consumers with greater access to cross-border dispute 
resolution processes.  Starting first with the development of the fast-track small claims 
procedures through the courts,71 then passing a Directive on the supervision and regulation of 
consumer ADR (and ODR) providers and their due process values (the “EU Directive”),72 
with which Member States have needed to comply since July 2015, and culminating in a 
regulation launching the ODR platform (the “EU Regulation”).73  The ODR Platform, 
launched in February 2016, is the first large-scale central online portal and is intended to be a 
space where ODR providers, consumers and merchants can all interact and file ODR claims.  
The EU ODR framework is presently solely focused on consumer protection and, 
accordingly, on increasing consumer confidence in buying products or services from other 
EU countries.  Inter alia, the EU Directive on ADR introduces a list of eight core fairness 
principles with which all ODR providers must comply before they can be listed on the new 
ODR Platform, thus essentially becoming accredited.  In their title form, these principles are: 
Accessibility, Expertise, Independence, Impartiality, Transparency, Effectiveness, Fairness, 
Legality and Liberty.74 
Similarly, after a series of consultations calling on the need for an international system to 
provide redress for online consumers and businesses, UNCITRAL formed its Working Group 
III on ODR in 2010.75  The decision of UNCITRAL was to not just limit its focus to 
                                                            
68 On EU and UNCITRAL see below; OECD, Conference on Empowering E-consumers: Strengthening 
Consumer Protection in the Internet Economy, (2009), (http://oecd.org/ict/econsumerconference/44047583.pdf) 
69 Bowers, M.G., “Implementing an Online Dispute Resolution Scheme: Using Domain Name Registration 
Contracts to Create a Workable Framework”, (2011), 40 Vanderbilt Law Review 1265, 1267 
70 EU Commission Green Paper of 9th February 2000 on Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters: the Problems 
Confronting the Cross-Border Litigant, COM(2000)51 final; EU Commission Green Paper of 20th December 
2002 on a European order for payment procedure and on measures to simplify and speed up small claims 
litigation, COM(2002)0746 final; EU Commission Green Paper of 19th April 2002 on Alternative Dispute 
Resolution in Civil and Commercial Matters, COM(2002)196 final; European Commission Recommendation 
2001/310/EC of 4 April 2001 on the Principles for Out-of-Court Bodies Involved in the Consensual Resolution 
of Consumer Disputes, OJ L109/56 
71 EU Regulation (No. 861/2007) of 11th July 2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure, OJ 
L199/01 – devised for cross-border court claims valued below €2,000; Another relevant directive was the EU 
Directive (No. 2008/52/EC) of 21st May 2008 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters, 
OJ L136/3 
72 EU Directive (No. 2013/11/EU) of 21st May 2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes, OJ 
L165/63 
73 Accessible at http://ec.europa.eu/odr; EU Regulation (No. 524/2013) of 21st May 2013 on online dispute 
resolution for consumer disputes, OJ L165/1 
74 The “Due process” principles are contained in the EU Directive Articles 5-11 with further details therein; The 
role of Member State “competent authorities” in accrediting ADR providers is also contained in Articles 18-20 
of the EU Directive 
75 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group III (Online Dispute Resolution) on the work of its twenty-second 
session, (Vienna, 13-17 December 2010), A/CN.9/716, 17 January 2011; Initial discussions began in 2000 –
UNCITRAL, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 17, A/55/17, (New 
York, 12 June-7 July 2000), Para. 385; The work of the UNCITRAL Working Group between 2010 and 2016 
can be reviewed at www.uncitral.org/uncitral/commission/working_groups/3Online_Dispute_Resolution.html 
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consumer disputes, but also to include B2B contracts as well.76  Instead, therefore, 
UNCITRAL decided a better route would be demarcating the types of claims which would be 
eligible, by specifically focusing on claims: (a) for goods or services not delivered, not 
delivered on time, not properly charged or debited, or not provided in accordance with the 
contract; or (b) where payment has not been received for goods or services rendered.77  
Spending most of their time on the development of suitable arbitration procedural rules, the 
UNCITRAL Working Group had hoped to later tackle issues such as an enforcement protocol 
and the regulation of ODR providers.78  In this sense, Hörnle has said how UNCITRAL 
seemed less concerned with protecting due process principles than the EU system.79  The EU 
system, by comparison, does not provide any specific guidance on recommended procedure, 
but provides the minimum baseline of standards with which private and public ADR 
providers must comply.   
It is also important to note why UNCITRAL focused on both B2B and B2C disputes. Firstly, 
it is now largely accepted that clearly distinguishing online consumers and small-scale traders 
is a difficult task, with millions of internet users engaging in business-like activities in a 
consumer-like manner.80  Secondly, even if you remove all of those disputes which can be 
managed internally by online intermediaries (eg credit/debit card and payment providers) and 
online service providers (eg Amazon, eBay, Facebook) (see infra), there remains many 
millions of other cross-border contracts which are entered into outside of these systems, 
including direct sales through websites, email-based contract negotiations, and contracts 
completed through thousands of other agency or listing sites.81  These interactions will 
include not just consumers, therefore, but also thousands of small-scale traders, SMEs and 
other organisations.  All combined this suggests a vast multi-billion-dollar incipient industry 
for high-volume low-value online dispute resolution.82  This article, therefore, examines both 
B2C and low-value B2B contracts by more specifically assessing contractual claims in a 
                                                            
76 Del Duca, L., Rule, C. & Loebl, Z., (2013), “Facilitating Expansion of Cross-Border ECommerce - 
Developing a Global Online Dispute Resolution System (Lessons Derived from Existing ODR Systems – Work 
of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law)”, 1 Penn State Journal of Law & International 
Affairs 59, 82 
77 UNCITRAL, Online dispute resolution for cross-border electronic commerce transactions: draft procedural 
rules (Track I), Report of Working Group III on ODR (Online Dispute Resolution), Thirtieth Session, 20-24th 
October 2014, (8 August 2014), A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.131, Draft Article 1(2); Supra n61 Cortés & de la Rosa, 
414 – Suggests excluding claims for delivery without payment so that the majority of captured B2C claims are 
where the claimant is the consumer 
78 UNCITRAL, Working Group III (Online Dispute Resolution) Note by the Secretariat, 28 February 2012, 
A/CN9/WGIII/WP112, para. 3 – UNCITRAL planned to eventually draft the following six ‘model’ rules and 
guidelines: (1) Procedural Rules for ODR, (2) Guidelines for Neutrals, (3) Minimum Standards for ODR 
Providers, (4) Supplementary Rules for ODR Providers, (5) Substantive Legal Principles for Resolving 
Disputes, and (6) Cross‐border Enforcement Mechanisms 
79 Hörnle, J, (2012), "Encouraging Online Dispute Resolution in the EU and Beyond-Keeping Costs Low or 
Standards High?", Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper 122, 147-148 
80 Supra n76 
81 American Bar Association, Addressing Disputes in Electronic Commerce: Final Recommendations and 
Report of The American Bar Association’s Task Force on Electronic Commerce and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, (2002), University of Washington School of Law, 7-8; Rule, C., (2002), Online Dispute Resolution 
for Business: B2B, Ecommerce, Consumer, Employment, Insurance, and Other Commercial Conflicts, John 
Wiley & Sons, 121-134 
82 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on a Common 
European Sales Law, 2011/0284 (COD), COM(2011) 635 final, (11 October 2011), 2-4; Eurobarometer, 
European contract law in business-to-business transactions, Analytical Report, Flash EB No. Series 320, 
Conducted by The Gallup Organization, Hungary European Commission, (http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/ 
flash/fl_320_en.pdf) 
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lower value bracket (eg below €10,000), which also fall outside the possibility for internal 
enforcement through such intermediaries or online service providers. 
In 2015, and 5 years after the formation of the UNCITRAL ODR Working Group, it was 
decided that such detailed work on an international ODR system was just too large a project 
at the present time and that scarce resources at UNCITRAL should be redistributed 
elsewhere.83  Instead they would simply reformulate the procedural rules and those general 
principles so far agreed into a final document entitled Technical Guidelines on Online 
Dispute Resolution (“UNCITRAL Guidelines”).84  During negotiations, it had been decided 
that because of issues with mandatory consumer arbitration clauses in many jurisdictions (see 
infra Section III(a) & (b)), it would be preferable to develop two ‘tracks’ of ODR rules: one 
for a process in which the parties are contractually bound to the ODR procedure and 
culminating in a binding award or outcome (Track I); and one for those jurisdictions where 
the parties are not legally bound by the ODR process (Track II).85  However, upon deciding 
to wind the project up, it was conceded that the resulting UNCITRAL Guidelines would have 
to be far broader and have sufficient flexibility to incorporate both ‘tracks’ under a ‘third 
proposal’.86  The Guidelines were therefore intended to work with both types of pre-dispute 
agreements (binding and non-binding), and instead include an opportunity for those parties 
who are not legally bound to become so bound during the ODR process.87  For those other 
non-legally binding decisions, resulting in ‘Recommendations’, the intention was that such 
decisions can be eventually enforced via intermediaries and providers such as by trustmarks, 
reputation schemes or payment chargeback options.88 
In July 2015, the UNCITRAL Commission gave the ODR Working Group only two further 
sessions to round up their work.89  It was in this brief period that negotiations were quickly 
halted and reworked into completing broad-based Guidelines.  Overall, this resulted in an 
unfinished and unoriginal draft set of principles and hortatory recommendations.  
Nevertheless, the work done should not be seen as wasted.  Until this point, there had taken 
place a detailed inter-jurisdictional and cross-cultural negotiation on suitable rules for a low-
value online arbitration procedure.  These negotiations, naturally, had to grapple with some of 
the most challenging aspects of legality and procedural fairness within future international 
ultra-low-value arbitration systems.  The ODR procedural rules which were nearing 
                                                            
83 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group III (Online Dispute Resolution) on the work of its thirty-first session, 
(New York, 9-13 February 2015), 3 March 2015, A/CN.9/833, paras. 16 & 18 – “the Commission had … 
expressed concerns about the length of time that some Working Groups had taken to finalize their texts” 
84 UNCITRAL, Online dispute resolution for cross-border electronic commerce transactions, Note by the 
Secretariat, Draft outcome document reflecting elements and principles of an ODR process, 
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.140, 22 December 2015; UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group III (Online Dispute 
Resolution) on the work of its thirty-third session, (New York, 29 February-4 March 2016), 11 March 2016, 
A/CN.9/868 
85 UNCITRAL, Online dispute resolution for cross-border electronic commerce transactions: draft procedural 
rules, 11 March 2013, A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.119, paras. 5-20 
86 Supra n83 & n84; UNCITRAL, Online dispute resolution for cross-border electronic commerce transactions: 
draft procedural rules (Track I), Addendum, Note by the Secretariat, A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.133/Add.1, 1 
December 2014 
87 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group III (Online Dispute Resolution) on the work of its thirty-first session, 
(New York, 9-13 February 2015), 3 March 2015, A/CN.9/833, para. 24 & 25; UNCITRAL, Report of Working 
Group III (Online Dispute Resolution), on the work of its thirtieth session, (Vienna, 20-24 October 2014), 
A/CN.9/827, 4 November 2014, paras. 70-74 
88 Ibid. 
89 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group III (Online Dispute Resolution) on the work of its thirty-second 
session, (Vienna, 30 November-4 December 2015), 16 December 2015, A/CN.9/862, para. 5 
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completion at UNCITRAL therefore (“UNCITRAL Rules”),90 although formally unfinished 
when work on them stopped in early 2015, can still be examined in parallel with the 
Guidelines later in Section V which looks at individual procedural elements of low-value 
arbitration. 
It should not be forgotten that ODR consists of more than just online arbitration and, in fact, 
the majority of online disputes are likely to be settled by private negotiation or mediation.91  
However, the importance of developing a successful and binding online arbitration process 
cannot be understated, for no one is likely to be willing to engage in protracted negotiation or 
mediation processes unless there is a significant risk that a legally binding adjudication will 
be forthcoming in the event of an impasse.92  In fact, the step-like progression through ADR 
processes from negotiation to mediation to arbitration (‘escalating’ or ‘stepped’ ADR 
procedure)93 was the intended model of procedure under the UNCITRAL Rules, with the 
hope that the costs of the process should correspond with where along in the procedure the 
dispute is resolved.94   
In addition to the work done at EU and UNCITRAL, there are other privately created ODR 
systems of note which operate through online intermediaries and service providers, and 
which have arisen over the duration of ODR’s first 20 years.  For example, the eBay Dispute 
Resolution Program,95 credit card chargeback systems96 and the ICANN Uniform Domain 
Resolution Policy (UDRP).97  The eBay Program was the forerunner to similar programs now 
in existence at other online service provides such as Amazon98and Paypal.99  Dispute 
management and claim filing systems are increasingly common in such large social and 
ecommerce networks and they enjoy the specific advantage of effective internal enforcement 
mechanisms.  For example, failure to follow the rules or enforce resulting judgements can 
result in an adverse trading reputation or rating, or in community ostracism or suspension, or 
can simply result in a payment being reversed.  Administrated internally by online 
intermediaries and service providers – and usually co-regulated by public authorities 
therein100 – these systems largely manage themselves in relative isolation from the public 
judicial system.  They are therefore not the specified focus of this paper.101  It is also worth 
noting, from a broader perspective, that traditional arbitration and mediation providers are 
                                                            
90 UNCITRAL, Online dispute resolution for cross-border electronic commerce transactions: draft procedural 
rules, Note by the Secretariat, 29 November 2014, A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.133 – hereafter referenced as 
“UNCITRAL Draft Rules” 
91 Kaufmann-Kohler, G. & Schultz, T., (2004), Online Dispute Resolution: Challenges for Contemporary 
Justice, 1st Ed, Kluwer Law International, 169 
92 Schmitz, A., (2013), “American Exceptionalism in Consumer Arbitration”, 10 Loyola University Chicago 
International Law Review 83, 102; Supra n79 Hörnle 133-134 
93 “Escalation” or “Tiered” clauses are common in international commercial dispute resolution, especially in the 
East, where negotiation and mediation are anticipated as a first stage with progression to a binding arbitral 
decision only if the first stage fails – Supra n9 Waincymer, 160-167 
94 Supra n61 Cortés & de la Rosa, 423 
95 Supra n76 Del Duca et al, 63-64 
96 Supra n76 Del Duca et al, 70-72 
97 See ICANN Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN, (http://icann.org/en/help/dndr/udrp) 
98 See Amazon Buyer Dispute Program (http://pay.amazon.com/help/201751580) 
99 See Paypal Resolution Center (http:// paypal.com/webapps/mpp/first-dispute) 
100 Marsden, C.T., (2011), Internet Co-Regulation: European Law, Regulatory Governance and Legitimacy in 
Cyberspace, Cambridge University Press 
101 See eg Kohl, U., (2013), “The rise and rise of online intermediaries in the governance of the Internet and 
beyond – connectivity intermediaries”, 26(2-3) International Review of Law, Computers and Technology 185; 
Kohl, U., (2013), “Google: the rise and rise of online intermediaries in the governance of the Internet and 
beyond (Part 2)”, 21(2) International Journal of Law and Information Technology 187 
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increasingly developing their systems or procedural rules to be accessible online102 or via 
fast-track procedures.103  Similarly, national legislatures are increasingly looking at ODR as a 
method for keeping domestic disputes out of the court system.104 
b) Uniform Domain Resolution Policy (UDRP) 
The UDRP, which has been in operation now for over two decades, presents a very useful 
template from which to draw research to assist with developing a cross-border online 
arbitration framework.  Devised by the not-for-profit privately-run Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the UDRP is solely intended to protect trademark 
owners from “cybersquatting”, where domain registrants intend to profit in bad faith from the 
goodwill attached to a domain name similar to a trademark owned by another.105  The UDRP 
are in essence basic arbitration procedural rules that every domain name owner will contract 
into when they enter purchase a domain through a domain registrar.   
The primary goals of the UDRP, to provide high expediency and affordability when 
adjudging cases of cybersquatting, could be said to have been achieved to great success.  
However, paradoxically, affordability comes at a price.106  There have been many objections 
made over the due process values of the UDRP, chief among these are perhaps the provision 
of strict time limits, the disposal with substantive law, the lack of oral hearings and oral 
evidence, and the ‘repeat player’ and partiality risks arising from unilateral controls over the 
institutional appointment.107  The imposition of strict time limits is perhaps the biggest 
criticism of the UDRP, wherein the respondent (domain owner) only has 7 days to present its 
defence after a claim has been notified to them, even though the complainant has as long as 
they wish to prepare their claim.108  Furthermore, the arbitrators are bound to render a 
decision within only 14 days from appointment.109  Many of these issues will therefore be 
addressed in Section V, which looks more closely at the elements of online arbitration 
procedure. 
Furthermore, the UDRP is interesting in that it too serves as a non-legally binding process.  
By having its own internal enforcement mechanism, ie the automatic transfer of a domain 
                                                            
102 For example, the AAA-ICDR Supplier/Manufacturer Online Dispute Resolution Protocol (http://icdr.org/ 
icdr/faces/icdrservices/msodr) 
103 See infra Section IV on Fast-Track Arbitration 
104 For example the English Civil Justice Service set up an advisory group to investigate the role ODR could 
play in domestic civil disputes, 23rd April 2014, (http://judiciary.gov.uk/announcements/cjc-sets-up-advisory-
group-for-online-dispute-resolution) 
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name to the complainant party, the UDRP is an effective arbitration process, but which is still 
subject to full judicial review should a party wish to expend the time and money to appeal 
any internally enforced judgement.110  This highlights the importance of the current search for 
online enforcement mechanisms in a consumer ODR framework.111  Indeed, not only does 
the development of powerful and effective internal enforcement mechanisms work to avoid 
reliance on domestic courts,112 but it further heavily impacts on the procedural and due 
process design of any ODR framework.  For, if internal enforcement mechanisms can be 
developed which are “powerful” enough, there is no need to make the arbitration ODR 
process reliant on the courts.  Instead, the process can be legally non-binding and parties 
could be free to appeal ODR awards to a full judicial review if they so wish, as is the case 
with the UDRP and other intermediary systems (supra).  If the enforcement mechanisms are 
“weak” in force, then there becomes more of a need for online arbitration awards to be given 
legal attachment, as parties may feel at liberty to ignore any unfavourable award, then calling 
into question the due process protections of the New York Convention.113  The plan for the 
UNCITRAL scheme, as well as the present EU project, seems to be that of focusing on 
reputation-based enforcement mechanisms.  In particular, providing trustmarks to merchants 
who are compliant with ODR outcomes and settlements.  However, whether such an 
“enforcement” system is to provide enough force to ensure internal compliance remains 
uncertain and, in some cases, highly doubted.114   
c) The UNCITRAL and EU Schemes 
The fact that the UNCITRAL Working Group on ODR was forced to abandon efforts at 
crafting an international ODR framework just how difficult the task is that lies ahead.   One 
example of a key arbitral due process challenge which faced the UNCITRAL Working Group 
was that of applicable law in the arbitration.  The idea most in favour was to empower 
arbitrators to decide disputes ex aequo et bono, ie with less of a concern with applicable law 
and more with what is ‘right and good’.115  On an initial glance this makes sense, for in the 
interests of expediency and considering the incredibly low value of the claim (where disputes 
may need to be decided in a matter of minutes), it is wholly impractical to expect arbitrators 
to explore sometimes complex legal questions in great detail or, given its international 
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context, to regularly conduct research across a multitude of applicable foreign laws.  It also 
makes sense when one considers that, given the potential case volumes, low-value ODR 
arbitrators are unlikely to be experienced international commercial arbitrators and more likely 
to have limited legal experience.116   
However, one key problem does arise in the context of mandatory law.  In every jurisdiction 
there are consumer protection laws which could be viewed as internationally mandatory, thus 
not subject to waiver by party agreement.  Schultz has said that to consider such laws could 
add much complexity to each case.117  Conversely, many authors have said that such laws 
should be applied for they provide a fundamental due process protection to consumers as 
weaker parties.118  This is a difficult issue, as is the question of international mandatory law 
generally.119  Perhaps, therefore, there is an argument that even an inexperienced arbitrator 
could decide ex aequo et bono, ‘taking account of any internationally mandatory laws raised 
by the parties.’  This at least at least shifts the burden on to the party intending to rely on the 
mandatory law to provide the arbitrator with the detail of the mandatory law on which they 
rely and to argue its mandatory nature, therefore relieving the arbitrator of a duty to raise 
mandatory laws ex officio.  Also, the phrase “taking account of” does not place a strict 
requirement on arbitrators to necessarily take full account of the law.  Further, a failure by a 
party to raise the mandatory law during the arbitration could risk their ability to oppose 
enforcement in court later.  Whether this would be sufficient, however, to satisfy Article 9 of 
the EU Directive on ADR which requires that mandatory consumer law is applied to any 
binding ADR process is as yet unknown, but perhaps unlikely.120 
It seems an unusual approach, as UNCITRAL were trying to do for several years, to develop 
a single set of recommended procedural rules for online arbitration.  Institutional variety can 
be of great benefit in terms of tailoring services and rules to suit particular disputes and can 
increase competition effects and industrial creativity between institutions.121  Nevertheless, 
the process of creating recommended rules can really help to focus on model procedural 
practices from the outset and, importantly, kickstart the possible development of public and 
private ODR providers.122  Under the Rules, there were challenging due process issues with 
the intended use of escalated procedure (ie from negotiation to mediation to arbitration).  For 
example, appointing a neutral as arbitrator who has already acted as mediator impacts heavily 
on the due process requirement of independence and avoidance of conflict of interests and yet 
it is impractical – in terms of cost and time – to appoint a new neutral to act as an arbitrator 
replacing the mediator.123  Furthermore, if the neutral receives higher fees for settling the case 
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in the final stage of arbitration, there could be less of a motivation on them to assist early 
settlement124 and there remain questions over whether the neutral, or a second-appointed 
neutral at the following stage, should in the interests of efficiency have access to prior 
negotiations of the parties, which would normally be confidential.125  Also, the idea of 
mandatory mediation is questionable from a theoretical standpoint as “to many ADR theorists 
mandatory mediation is an oxymoron”.126  Other due process issues relating to the failed 
UNCITRAL scheme, such as these, will be raised in Section V. 
By focusing first on due process minimums, rather than any recommended procedure, the EU 
system has provided a greater level of autonomy to the ODR market, enabling providers to 
cater their services for various niches and to develop diversity across the industry to the 
fullest extent.  Since July 2015, every consumer ADR provider in the EU has needed to 
ensure they comply with the 8 Core Principles of the EU Directive.127  The main issue 
however – and why the EU ODR scheme remains low in terms of adoption – is the Article 10 
principle of Liberty, which essentially bars adhesionary mandatory arbitration clauses made 
“before the dispute has materialised”.128 The result is that only agreements to enter into 
arbitration made post-dispute are binding on consumers in Europe (see infra).  This 
commitment to consumer protection, through the removal of pre-dispute clauses, had a 
significant knock-on effect at UNCITRAL where, as noted earlier, the Working Group had 
attempted to develop two sets of rules to manage national laws which view mandatory 
arbitration clauses as either binding or non-binding.129 
d) Adhesionary Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and the United States Debate 
The enforceability of standard-term mandatory arbitration clauses presents a real dilemma 
when considered in the context of online consumer arbitration.  The debate has actually been 
raging in the United States for some time regarding domestic consumer arbitration.  There, 
under a more liberal market regulatory model, the Supreme Court consistently rules that the 
Federal Arbitration Act has a strong pro-arbitration policy and that consumers, employees 
and other “weaker” parties should all subscribe to buyer-beware principles when signing 
standard-term contracts.  Thus, there is an increasing acceptance by the Supreme Court that 
more powerful organisations are able to include mandatory arbitration clauses in their small-
print standard-terms and not only strip weaker bargaining parties of their right to go to court 
but, just as significantly, to devise procedural rules largely at their own discretion.130  In this 
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sense, it has become common for powerful merchants to devise arbitration procedures that 
remove document discovery procedures, remove class actions, provide unilateral rights for 
the stronger party to take up court action and which impose onerous fees or travelling 
requirements on consumers.131  Another issue, also prevalent in the context of the UDRP,132 
is the issue of “repeat player” syndrome and the fact that arbitrators and arbitration 
institutions have a strong financial interest in merchants electing them in their standard-terms.  
This creates a potential partiality risk on the part of the arbitration providers in that they have 
a strong financial interest in securing future work from the repeat players.133 
There have been strong calls from many quarters for the Arbitration Fairness Act to be 
passed, blanket banning any adhesionary mandatory arbitration clauses and only permitting 
consumer and employee arbitrations to be entered into post-dispute.134  Their primary 
argument is that if arbitration is of such great benefit to weaker bargaining parties, being 
cheaper, quicker and more informal, then there is no reason why they would not agree to 
arbitration post-dispute; the main point being that they have a choice.135  The other side see 
that arbitration brings many benefits to consumers and employees above court litigation and 
see no reason why the market cannot be regulated simply by a federal law providing codified 
due process rules to be enforced by courts at the stage of agreement or award enforcement.136  
Currently, the courts are only able to rely on vague and unpredictable common law 
principles, particularly that of unconscionability, to find arbitration agreements or awards 
unenforceable on consumers.137  Furthermore, authors raise the very valid concern that if 
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arbitration becomes optional at post-dispute stage it will not be utilised.  Parties at the post-
dispute stage find it hard to agree on anything and, more importantly, powerful parties who 
are uncertain of a successful outcome could simply refuse to enter into any dispute resolution 
process which is more affordable and accessible for a weaker party once a dispute arises.138 
Given the deference to private regulation of arbitration, there are increasing references to 
privately drafted due process principles created by arbitration institutions, such as the AAA’s 
Consumer Due Process Protocol.139  These principles are enforced by the institutions 
purportedly refusing appointments where the terms of the arbitration agreement do not 
conform.  Despite empirical evidence that this private regulation has a positive impact,140 it 
surely makes no sense to enforce and control important due process protections at the private 
level, without effective and predictable public measures of control.141  There seems no reason 
why a codified and accessible set of due process principles cannot be created by the 
legislature to be interpreted by courts when reviewing the fairness of any adhesionary 
arbitration agreements or awards.  This would harmonise practice across arbitration 
institutions and US corporations, increase the consistency of court interpretations and create 
familiar clauses by which arbitrations will regularly be conducted.142 
In Europe, there are minor variations, but on the whole, it is largely accepted that weaker 
parties cannot be compelled to enter into legally binding arbitration through a standard-term 
contract unless they agree to it post-dispute.143  This sits well with Europe’s pro-consumer 
protection attitude.144  The primary instrument operating in the EU in the protection of 
consumers is the 1993 Directive on Unfair Terms in Contracts, which under Article 3 and its 
accompanying annex at point (q), bars consumer contract terms “excluding or hindering the 
consumer’s right to take legal action.”145  Being a relatively ambiguous Directive, it leaves a 
lot of discretion to Member States to design the rules on pre-dispute arbitration agreements.  
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But all Member States, in some form or other, carefully control or ban pre-dispute consumer 
arbitration agreements.146  This strong consumer-protectionist attitude has also been 
emphasised again by the aforementioned EU Directive on ADR and its Article 10 Principle of 
Liberty.  A key question in this area of law was recently forwarded to the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU).  In February 2017, the District Court of Verona referred to the 
CJEU on whether Italian legislation – in this case requiring compulsory consumer mediation 
before an appeal to the courts can be made – is compliant with the 2013 EU Directive on 
ADR Article 10.147  It is perhaps likely that the CJEU will make a similar determination to 
that in Alassini & Others,148 which saw compulsory mediation as permissible as long it does 
severely disadvantage consumers or foreclose access to the courts following efforts at 
mediation.  All of this makes it clear, however, that any form of binding arbitration which 
would foreclose access to public courts, is not going to be permissible under EU consumer 
protection legislation. 
The major difficulty facing the success of any international low-value ODR scheme is surely 
the ability to compel both parties into the process.  This is simply because traditional cross-
border court procedures, usually being the only legally-binding alternative to online 
arbitration, is not really an alternative.149  The high cost, inaccessibility and inconvenience of 
traditional cross-border processes makes ODR “not so much an option, as the only option.”150  
Therefore, unless the EU compliant-merchant trustmarks and reputation-based mechanisms 
turn out to be a surprise success story – which on the evidence so far looks quite unlikely151 – 
the majority of online merchants are probably likely to be more willing to avoid mass 
consumer redress and refuse to enter into those online arbitrations where they feel uncertain 
of a successful outcome.152  They would do so safe in the knowledge that rarely will a 
disgruntled consumer pursue court action for any dispute valued below several thousand 
Euros.  The only other alternative could be the provision of efficient online courts, capable of 
handling mass volumes of low-value online disputes.  Some jurisdictions around the world 
are slowly developing the concept and technology of online courts.  However, in each 
instance, the projects are in their absolute infancy and certainly, given their important 
mandate to ensure high accuracy and strict adherence to the rule of law, do not appear 
capable of handling vast volumes of cross-border claims anytime soon.153 
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Essentially then we will be back right where we started: with no ODR solution at all.  
Furthermore, there will be a continuing diminution in the rule of law and justice, as 
merchants (or, not forgetting consumers, eg for non-payment or failure to return goods) 
simply cherry-pick which arbitrations they are willing to enter into.154  The EU system has 
attempted to remedy this as far as possible by, for example, requiring that EU e-merchants 
provide their consumers with information regarding the ODR platform,155 yet they are still 
not bound to enter into any ODR process.156  Similarly, there is provision within the Directive 
for Member States to asymmetrically bind only merchants into arbitration.  However, 
Member States so far seem very reluctant to do this considering the costs and potential 
restrictions it could place on their domestic businesses.157  By making some types of pre-
dispute arbitration agreements enforceable, both the consumer and merchant would be free to 
bind themselves into using arbitration to resolve their disputes and cannot be at liberty to 
avoid a legally binding process altogether.158  Merchants must be convinced to agree to ODR 
procedures at the pre-dispute stage and the only way this is likely is if both parties are bound 
to use the procedure, otherwise there may be little benefit to the merchant to later ‘opt-in’ to 
all claims against them.159  If it were in fact therefore possible to enforce some limited forms 
of adhesionary arbitration agreements upon consumers, then we would need to develop 
stricter due process rules to protect the consumers who become bound by such agreements 
and to assist courts in interpreting the fairness (and thus enforceability) of any arbitration 
agreement or award.160   
e) Enforceability under the New York Convention 
Almost all international arbitrations – except for those under an Article I(3) Commercial 
Reservation, or from or in those few states that are non-signatories, or which come under the 
jurisdiction of an alternative multilateral treaty such as the International Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes) – are enforced cross-border under the New York 
Convention.  As discussed in Section II, the New York Convention was drafted in light of the 
fact that the vast majority of international arbitration’s customers have been commercial 
parties of roughly equal bargaining power and often possessing the financial resource to 
invest in proficient legal advice and representation.  It therefore pays a significant level of 
deference to freedom of contract and party autonomy and provides only minimal due process 
protections.  Similarly, the national laws that govern international arbitration operate under 
the same principles and respect the parties’ rights to almost select their own due process 
rules.  Furthermore, in the context of low-value online arbitrations, the courts at the seat of 
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arbitration may be not only geographically inaccessible, but also practically inaccessible in 
terms of language barriers for example.161   
If the EU ODR system continues with its low adoption by merchants and consumers, we 
might then need to realistically consider how we can make adhesionary consumer and low-
value arbitration agreements enforceable – to the benefit of both parties – without preventing 
a consumer’s right to their day in court.162  To this there are perhaps three possible solutions.  
Firstly, there is the continuing development towards online court processes as mentioned 
earlier.  These could effectively provide consumers with their day in court, provided they 
were tailored to handle low-value cross-border consumer claims in the defendant’s territory 
(thus removing the need for cross-border enforcement measures).  Not only are there likely 
prohibitive legal and logistical challenges with this idea, but ever-tightening government 
budgets for judicial administration across the world, may well rule out any government-built 
solution capable of resolving such vast volumes of cross-jurisdictional claims.  Secondly, 
there is the creation of effective online enforcement mechanisms, for example through 
collaboration of credit card companies and online payment processors with an international, 
publicly regulated, register of accredited ODR providers.163  This could mean that the ODR 
process need not be legally binding, but simply internally binding as a condition of a 
consumer’s contract.164  This would be a highly effective solution, which would bolster to 
effectiveness of the EU Commission’s work on ODR, yet it would be an incredibly complex 
and difficult challenge to pull off at an international scale.  Especially when one considers the 
immensely complex and amorphous features of cyberspace, with its countless regulatory grey 
spots, its indifference to mass regulation and its tendency towards complex models of co-
regulation.165 
The final alternative, which may be achievable in the immediate global online environment, 
may simply be that consumers are deprived of their day in court.  There is no reason why, 
providing there are sufficient and well-regulated due process safeguards at the point of 
enforcement, arbitration cannot be effectively used to resolve low-value consumer disputes in 
lieu of the courts.166  The answer here might well be the demarcation of the types of claims 
which are eligible to be subject to mandatory arbitration – much like the UNCITRAL Rules 
which were eventually put on hold.167  Thus, in the context of consumer contracts, the 
adhesionary arbitration clause could make arbitration of claims only mandatory where the 
claim relates to failure to deliver or pay for goods and services which match their 
description.168  For all other claims resulting from the contract outside this narrow definition 
(for example, a tortious claim resulting from defective goods), they would be subject to court 
litigation in the usual way.  Where the type of claim is outside this mandatory definition, 
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because the parties already have an arbitral institution in place for simpler claims, we could 
find an increasing agreement to arbitration at the post-dispute stage as well.   
An alternative method for demarcating claims may be based along claim value.  For example, 
any claim valued at above €1,000 is not subject to mandatory arbitration.  Such a solution 
may appear simpler through the use of a bright line rule.  However, it does not take account 
of the complexity of the claim: a low-value IP-related claim may still be very technical in a 
legal sense.  Furthermore, it is not always clear at the outset what the exact value of a claim 
may be, before more detailed investigations are made as part of the procedure.  Demarcating 
the types of claim like this would need to deal with or remove the opportunity for 
counterclaims, otherwise a respondent might counterclaim an alternative claim to move the 
dispute outside the remit of the mandatory scheme.169  In summary, unless effective online 
enforcement mechanisms can be developed for an international consumer arbitration 
framework, what will probably be needed is a solution addressing the enforceability of 
certain types of online adhesionary arbitration agreements.170  Much like that which is needed 
in the context of American consumer and employment arbitration, this law would need to 
specifically codify due process principles with which the arbitration agreement, procedure, 
institution, arbitrators and parties would all need to comply.171   
What does this mean for the New York Convention?  Firstly, if an international convention 
addressing recognition and enforcement of certain forms of consumer ODR agreements and 
awards could be created and widely ratified, it would be possible to supersede the New York 
Convention under Article 30(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.172  
Assuming that such an incredible feat of international cooperation proves simply too difficult 
for now, some suggestions have been made about how else online low-value claims may be 
carved out from the New York Convention.  One suggestion has been for courts to rely on the 
Article II(2) writing requirement of the New York Convention to remove online disputes 
from the purview of the Convention.173  However, this seems like a risky and unnecessary 
approach, going against a purposive interpretation of the instrument and removing all future 
online arbitrations, of any type, from its purview.174  Another suggestion has been the use of 
the Article I(3) ‘Commercial Reservation’ of the New York Convention, enabling all 
signatory states to specifically apply the Convention to differences arising out of legal 
relationship “considered as commercial under the national law of the State making such 
declaration”.175  While this appears a simple solution, it becomes more complicated when 
one considers that many jurisdictions may define ‘commercial’ in a variety of ways, for 
example in the United States ‘commercial relationship’ includes consumer and employment 
relationships.176  Another idea may be through the operation of internationally mandatory 
arbitration laws at every seat of arbitration, such as through the creation of an additional 
Protocol to the UNCITRAL Model Law of International Arbitration, which requires certain 
consumer disputes to be subject to additional mandatory due process safeguards and arranges 
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for a reciprocal recognition agreement.177  However, there is still the risk of forum shopping 
and also that potential enforcement courts would not view such rules as internationally 
mandatory and capable of overpowering party autonomy.178  
Furthermore, how the new law will regulate arbitration at the procedural level remains 
uncertain.  For example, provided an EU consumer arbitration provider complies with the 
minimal requirements of the EU Directive’s eight core principles, there is no codified set of 
rules to guide arbitration procedural design to ensure that merchants do not control and 
impose unfair procedural rules through such providers.179  Assessing each arbitration 
agreement or award on its due process merits across a multitude of national enforcement 
courts, even with an instrument for guidance, could also lead to many inconsistent 
interpretations.180  One solution could be an extension of the current approach of directly 
regulating ODR providers – but further accrediting or discrediting their due process rules and 
practices directly – then ultimately only enforcing arbitration agreements or awards which go 
through accredited providers.181  In summary, however, there is likely to be far more work 
ahead of us.  How the introduction of mandatory due process rules to into an international 
scheme dealing with low-value arbitration is to be done, enabling certain types of pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses to become enforceable upon both parties, requires further focus and 
hopefully these questions can be picked up by UNCITRAL again, or another international 
organisation, in the coming years. 
IV. Theoretical Challenges of Due Process within International Low-Value 
Arbitration  
In this second half of the paper, we will be investigating what types of due process 
protections one might expect to see within an international consumer ODR framework, 
assuming that expediency, affordability and accessibility are three mandatory requirements of 
any successful ODR process.182  
a) Arbitral Accuracy and the Acceptance of “Rough Justice” 
Due process comes at a cost.183  To have the highest level of due process possible – 
permitting the parties every opportunity for example to extend time limits, to present every 
potential article of evidence, fully cross-examine every witness, conduct extensive discovery, 
appoint and cross-examine experts, request a 3-arbitrator tribunal, challenge arbitrators freely 
on weak allegations of bias and hold extensive oral hearings – would result in extremely high 
costs and a long drawn-out arbitration (in this example perhaps taking years).  On the flip-
side, given that the average consumer dispute is estimated to value $146, realistically 
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consumer arbitration should be conducted within the timescale of a few minutes, or at most, 
hours, in terms of arbitrator time.  Due process therefore negatively correlates with the time 
and costs of the arbitration: you cannot have all three. 
Park famously details this play-off between time, cost and quality of award in his article, 
Arbitrators and Accuracy.184  Park encourages arbitrators to empower commercial parties 
early in the process to make a choice between these 3 competing objectives.185  He represents 
the tangential nature of the choice by showing a triangle with the 3 objectives at each corner 
and requesting parties to place a dot in the triangle to highlight where their preferences lie.  
He warns overall that in the context of commercial disputes, arbitration should not lose its 
“moorings” as an adjudicatory truth-seeking process.186  And indeed, the importance of 
keeping arbitration as a high quality truth-seeking process makes sense in the context of high-
value disputes, given the often significant value of the decision and the lack of opportunities 
for appeal.187   In the context of low-value consumer disputes, however, time and costs 
simply need to assume a far higher importance than the “truth-seeking” quality of the 
arbitration process, for “the constraints on time and costs are not mere irksome idealized 
requirements, they are strict cut-offs on the ladder of feasibility.”188  Therefore, Park’s 
triangle which represents these 3 competing concerns may look something like this for low-
value online consumer disputes. 
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Quite clearly this demonstrates that in the context of low-value disputes, the quality of the 
arbitral procedure as a truth-seeking process will be severely diminished.   Note also the 
slight tilt towards lower ‘costs’ than ‘time’, given that a neglect of cost-saving in particular 
could jeopardise the entire feasibility of ODR.   
In addition to balancing these three objectives, the further balancing of the twin objectives of 
fairness and efficiency has become a familiar practice undertaken by international 
commercial arbitrators under their autonomous powers.189   To some, efficiency is in itself a 
due process value; invoking the adage ‘justice delayed is justice denied’.190  And certainly its 
observance could be seen as a vital rule of arbitral procedural law in some jurisdictions.191  It 
is therefore sometimes observed that the two are not necessarily always in opposition and in 
fact that poor efficiency can denote an unfair procedure.192  In fact, the most important aspect 
of fairness is often said to be the perception of fairness.  Indeed, parties are less likely to 
question a result if they felt the procedure was fair and that they were empowered to 
influence the outcome.193  To this end, some might say that any outcome is just, provided the 
procedure was just.194  In the context of low-value disputes, therefore, providing a process 
which is both fair and efficient is an intriguingly complex challenge.  
This is the crux of the dilemma for due process within international consumer arbitration.195  
Not many authors have attempted to answer this very challenging conflict between time, 
costs and due process within consumer arbitration directly.196  Hörnle argues that given the 
public importance of consumer protection, the due process safeguards in consumer ODR 
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should be very high.197  She calls for the outright application of mandatory consumer 
protection law, no word limits for written submissions, extended time limits, an entitlement to 
discovery and a relative freedom for parties to request a hearing.198  She even spends time 
suggesting the application of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights into 
online consumer arbitration.199  Two subsequent reviews of her work, however, rightly 
question her optimistic thinking.200  Schultz points out that the requirement of incredibly low 
costs and quick results simply cannot permit such high levels of due process.  In low-value 
ODR “arbitration is no longer the truth-seeking process that it is for commercial, investment 
or interstate disputes, but a process to avoid crass disrespect of the contract or basic legal 
obligations in a consumer transaction.”201  Nonetheless, he leaves a lot of the hard questions 
still unanswered in terms of how this ‘rough-justice’ world could become widely accepted, 
admitting that the search for answers “has been the Grail quest … for the last decade.”202   
Instead of focusing on due process protections that provide low-value consumers with a 
raised level of due process, such as might be expected within high-value commercial 
arbitration or within civil proceedings, maybe the focus should be on recalibrating the 
bargaining inequalities between the parties.  Provided both parties are given an affordable 
and expedient process – the “rough justice” as Schultz calls it – then both parties should be 
more willing to accept the end result.203  The main point being that merchants should not be 
given a wide and unfettered control over the design of arbitration procedure or the 
appointment of the arbitrators.  Public regulation must come in ensuring that the only 
enforceable arbitration agreements and awards are those that do not cause any significant 
disadvantage to the consumer.  More importantly, they should not be excessively concerned 
with giving consumers a substantial opportunity to present their case or request extensive 
truth-seeking, considering the concurrent objectives of speed and affordability.  It is 
important, however, to distinguish here between “truth-seeking” and equality.  Under this 
system, there would only be a significant reduction in the level of truth-seeking in low-value 
arbitrations.  However, this does not have to mean a reduction in equality between the parties.  
For both parties would be on level terms and would respect the diminished role of truth-
seeking, instead “seeking” a quick and affordable resolution.204  Whether this sort of rough 
justice will ever be to the taste of European legislatures is perhaps unlikely,205 but given the 
potentiality of a low take-up of the ODR platform by merchants, it could simply be a case of 
“rough justice - or no justice”.206   
It is a very valid question, therefore, to ask whether such low-value arbitration in any sense 
resembles the international arbitrations that we know and understand.  Or whether, as is 
perhaps more likely, all consumer disputes will be managed through informal, internal and 
user-friendly online programs, guiding users through a procedural step-like process akin to 
eBay, Amazon and Paypal programs.  Nevertheless, even if such non-traditional ODR 
programs continue as the norm for online consumer disputes, there are millions of cross-
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border civil disputes, of all types, which fall within a low-value category (below €10,000).  
Recognising these ever-growing millions of high-volume low-value claims should leave no 
doubt about growing demands for formal dispute resolution mechanisms  offering the three 
cornerstone principles of expediency, efficiency and accuracy in the coming century.  The 
remainder of this paper, therefore, should provide crucial inspiration for dispute resolution 
entrepreneurs and professionals, as well as regulators, in developing suitable arbitration 
procedures in this imminent and exciting, yet incipient, industry. 
b) Deference to Institutional Rules and the Diminution in the Role of Party & 
Arbitrator Autonomy 
Within this new international consumer arbitration framework there is likely to be a 
fundamental shift from the party/arbitrator/institution balance as it currently exists in 
international commercial arbitration.  As detailed, presently in international arbitration there 
is a wide deference to party autonomy.  There is also a wide level of arbitrator autonomy, 
wherein the arbitrators are empowered under the lex loci arbitri or institutional rules to 
possess a broad level of procedural control.207  Arbitrators are usually mandated to be 
adaptable and to cooperate with the parties in developing a procedure that fits the type of 
dispute and the expectations of the parties, both in terms of cost and time, but also in terms of 
the parties’ cultural backgrounds.208   
The institutions in international commercial arbitration, on the other hand, play a secondary 
role.  Often their rules are subject to wide alteration by party autonomy and only a small 
fraction of their rules can be classed as ‘mandatory’.209  Furthermore, given this broad 
cultural diversity of parties and types of dispute, institutional rules almost act as a blank 
canvas, leaving a wide berth to the ingenuity of the arbitration tribunal working with the 
parties to develop a suitable procedure in each case.210  Park, in another insightful article of 
his, promotes a move away from this practice.211  He feels that institutions essentially side-
step the hard questions that come from developing a procedure that satisfies both parties, for 
in reality, many difficult procedural decisions that arbitrators need to make in situ are often 
welcomed by one party and seen as unfair by the other, often putting arbitrators in a difficult 
position vis-à-vis their autonomy, further risking allegations of bias.212  He saw no reason 
why a large variety of institutional rules, wherein many of these hard questions have already 
been laid out in a procedural template, could not be available on the market.  Parties would 
still be at liberty to alter these rules, provided both parties agree, however the default 
procedure in the absence of agreement inter partes would be already mapped out.   
Many authors, however, reserve high praise over the flexibility that arbitrator autonomy 
brings to international commercial arbitration.  Indeed, procedural malleability is one 
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international arbitration’s flagship advantages.213  There is logic in both arguments, although 
there would perhaps be no harm in having greater levels of competition and variety across the 
institutional market.214  Furthermore, wider procedural autonomy not only calls for skilled 
and experienced (and therefore expensive) arbitrators, but it also risks higher costs and 
timescales, both as a result of extensive time being spent on important procedural decisions, 
but further as a result of stronger parties pushing for more extensive and costly procedures in 
the hope of forcing the other party into early settlement.215  
This is where we have in recent years seen the development of “fast-track” or “expedited” 
arbitration rules across many leading international arbitration institutions.216  Respecting the 
fact that a large number of international arbitration’s customers want their disputes resolved 
in a highly expeditious and affordable manner,217 institutions are providing parties with the 
option to pursue the fast-track route.  These institutional rules, which parties can either elect 
post-dispute or within their original arbitration clause, essentially impose restrictive time 
limits at the various stages of arbitration procedure, as well as limit the types of permissible 
evidence, unless both parties agree.218  They still often contain an element of arbitrator 
autonomy to bend the rules based on the circumstances, but the significance of them is that 
they impose procedural restrictions (or defaults) at the outset, such as dispensing with the 
need for oral hearings or a strict limitation on discovery processes.219  Many institutions are 
therefore reporting the increasing use and popularity of such fast-track procedures.220 
This is all highly pertinent to the development of international consumer arbitration.  Relying 
too much on arbitrators in cooperation with the parties to draw up the procedural framework 
at the outset simply costs too much, requires experience on the part of the arbitrator, risks the 
extension of time limits beyond necessary limits, risks the inclusion of unnecessary evidential 
procedures and further risks the appearance of bias of the arbitrator.  It is well accepted that 
by invoking institutional rules into their arbitration agreement, parties are taken to include all 
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those rules as part of their agreement,221 thus it would not be countering party autonomy 
rights to impose pre-determined rules which parties can only alter if both parties agree.  
These rules can therefore be developed to ensure the procedure is eminently cheap and quick, 
while also ensuring that stronger bargaining parties cannot later adapt the procedure to their 
advantage.222  As a result, institutions within low-value consumer arbitration are likely to 
play a much larger role in designing and administering arbitrations,223 and their rules are 
likely to be significantly more detailed than the kinds of institutional rules familiar in 
international commercial arbitration.224  Furthermore, arbitrators and parties need not be 
highly knowledgeable in arbitral procedure, as they will not be relied on less to flexibly 
develop procedural rules ad hoc225 and, more importantly, weaker parties cannot be 
compelled to accept a disadvantageous alteration in procedure unless both parties agree.226 
V. Delivering Due Process, Value and Efficiency in Online Arbitration 
Procedural Rules 
a) Tribunal Construction and Appointment 
On many occasions, it has been said the selection and appointment of the tribunal is one of 
the most important aspects of arbitration, for it is the arbitrators who both guide the entire 
procedure and make the final determinations of fact and law.227  Nevertheless, the 
appointment process can become very time-consuming if not controlled.  Firstly, in terms of 
low-value consumer arbitration, rarely is it suggested that the standard should be for 3-
arbitrator tribunals, rather than a single arbitrator. 228  The benefits of a 3-party tribunal make 
sense in the context of high-value and often complex disputes in international arbitration, but 
given the low-value of consumer disputes, it is not economically rational to expect a 3-party 
tribunal, unless the parties both decide at the post-dispute stage (with the consequent tripling 
of arbitrator fees). 
The more challenging question relates to the selection and challenge of the appointed 
arbitrator.  In international commercial arbitration it is often left to the parties to agree on an 
arbitrator, failing which the institutional provider will make the appointment.229  However, 
many authors have disagreed on the extent to which parties should control the appointment of 
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arbitrators in low-value consumer arbitrations, where given the common party types, direct 
conflict of interests are likely to be more rare:230 if the pure objective is high speed and low 
cost, then the institution’s appointment should be less open to challenge.  However, being 
able to select your own judge is a fundamental aspect of arbitration and a useful due process 
safeguard in avoiding partiality.231  The standard in most fast-track arbitration procedures is 
to reduce the time limits within which the parties can challenge,232 for example the ACICA 
and KLRCA expedited arbitration rules set 7 days instead of the usual 14233 and the CIETAC 
expedited rules 10 days.234  The EU ADR Directive provides general disclosure rules of 
circumstances which may be seen to impact independence and impartiality, with provision 
for institutions to make replacements where parties object.235  In terms of party equalising, 
however, this might not provide the ideal protection, as the most important aspect of the 
appointment process should perhaps be ensuring that all parties have an “equal voice” in the 
appointment of the arbitrator.236 
The UNCITRAL Guidelines also suggest that neutrals should disclose any circumstances that 
may raise doubts as to their impartiality.237  However, within the unfinished UNCITRAL 
Rules, it was being debated whether to introduce a freedom for parties to reject neutrals 
recommended to their case by the ODR provider within a 2-day time limit.238  Further 
permitting both parties to reject up to a maximum of three neutrals without giving reasons for 
doing so. Although the intention was good, this does not seem like a logical procedural 
protection: doing so could permit the procedure to be freely extended an additional 14 days 
and ultimately there is no guarantee that either party would have been happy with the 7th and 
final appointment.  Although these rules are not mandatory, but provide only a 
recommendation, a better suggestion which would ensure that both parties are given an 
“equal voice” in the appointment of the arbitrator could be to use a ‘pool of arbitrators’ 
system.239  de Witt suggests emulating the NYSE Rules wherein parties are presented with 5 
arbitrators and a brief synopsis of their skills, experience and background, from which both 
parties rank them in order of preference 1-5.240  Certainly, the use of arbitrator pools is a 
well-respected method for empowering parties to make expedient selections while still 
protecting the opportunity to avoid potential bias.241  However, it needs to be carefully 
designed so as not to become cumbersome or time-consuming.242  Similarly, there should 
perhaps be a back-up provision for the institution to make an impartial appointment where a 
recalcitrant party refuses to engage in the appointment process. 
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The more important question then is how ODR institutions would compile each pool of 
arbitrators and their role in ensuring the available pool is well-balanced in the circumstances 
of the case and the parties involved.243  One suggestion which has not received enough 
academic attention is providing parties with an equal voice not just in the appointment of the 
arbitrators, but also the appointment of the ODR provider itself.244  A major concern in terms 
of repeat player advantage in mandatory arbitration in the US is the power of the stronger 
party to pre-select the arbitration provider in their standard terms.245  Furthermore, there is 
evidence that the most popular providers of UDRP arbitration are those that decide most 
often in favour of the claimant – the party who chooses the provider.246  However, presuming 
ODR providers comply with transparency rules around their processes and provide 
information and statistical data which can be utilised by the parties making the selection, then 
the fairest method of avoiding any institutional bias might be leaving their appointment to the 
post-dispute stage in a procedure that enables both parties to control the appointment.247  This 
could be challenging in practice, but it has the ability to instantly and entirely remove all 
ongoing concerns over institutional bias, forum shopping and repeat player advantages.248  
There is already provision under Article 9(3) and (4) of the EU Regulation for the ODR 
platform to provide recommended ADR entities to disputants based on their case 
circumstances, however there is no obligation on the respondent party to accept any of the 
recommendations.249  If binding clauses were permissible, perhaps it would be possible for 
the platform to recommend 3 providers and ask the parties to rank their preferred providers in 
order 1-3. 
The qualifications and training of the arbitrators is another challenging area.  Everyone 
accepts that given the low-value of ODR disputes and the low fees, the arbitrators appointed 
are not likely to be experienced arbitrators or even lawyers.250  Yet they might perhaps be 
expected to have some legal knowledge.251  Rule et al pointed out how in the case of eBay’s 
Dispute Resolution program the neutrals are not legally qualified but that language fluency is 
a useful asset.252  A logical place to look would be law students and graduates; they would 
expect modest fees and would be motivated to gain experience in international dispute 
resolution.253  Interestingly, the training of the neutrals has also been raised.254  Cortés has 
suggested that training should not be self-regulated,255 although there seems little strength in 
this argument.  Provided the ODR providers are required to be transparent in their practices, 
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then their training requirements and processes should be included within this.256  Then there 
is also the nationality of the arbitrators.  It was suggested that the UNCITRAL Rules ensure 
that ODR providers take the nationality of the parties into account when appointing a 
neutral.257  There is institutional variety in the weight attached to the nationality of appointed 
arbitrators,258 yet in the context of ODR it has been suggested that there might be an uneven 
distribution of alternative nationalities of arbitrators to the nationalities of common 
consumers of the service.259  Given the geographical diversity of the online community and 
the likely availability of low-value arbitrators, it seems doubtful that there will be a lack of 
arbitrator diversity and it might perhaps eventually become common practice to appoint an 
arbitrator of a 3rd nationality where the two parties’ nationalities differ. 
b) Time Limits 
The very first thing that is noticeable about the UNCITRAL Rules, the UDRP and all other 
fast-track arbitration systems260 is the imposition of strict time limits.  As mentioned, the 
UDRP provide the respondent only 7 days to prepare and file their response and the arbitrator 
only 14 days from appointment to deliver their binding decision.  The UNCITRAL Rules 
were still uncertain on the correct time limits for the arbitrator to produce an award by the 
time negotiations were brought to a halt.  The last draft provided the parties with a time limit 
of “no later than 10 days” between the ‘facilitated settlement’ stage and the arbitrator’s 
deadline for decision,261 with a further requirement that the award “be rendered promptly, 
preferably within ten calendar days [from a specified point in proceedings]”.262  The EU 
Directive is far more flexible in this regard, in that it only requires an entire procedure to be 
completed within 90 days,263 although the EU Regulation anticipates that disputes through 
the ODR platform will be completed within a total of 30 days.264  Hörnle has highlighted how 
these proposed time limits of UNCITRAL and the EU ODR platform are severely restrictive 
and unrealistic,265 pointing out that the Dutch Consumer Complaints Board, an existing 
successful domestic ODR system, provides respondents with 4 weeks to prepare a 
response.266   
Nevertheless, the imposition of strict time limits is a vital and necessary protection against 
the escalation of costs, timescales and dilatory tactics.267  Realistically, time limits should be 
proportional to the value of the claim: To spend weeks and weeks over a $150 dispute is an 
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irrational expectation from a simple cost-benefit analysis of party and arbitrator time.268  
Furthermore, keeping the process time-limited encourages the practice of front-loading, so 
that parties are aware of all the evidence before them early on, leading to higher settlement 
rates and removing 11th hour submissions.269  In terms of general enforceability within 
commercial arbitration, it appears that given the recognition of efficiency as a core objective, 
the imposition of restrictive time limits is less of a concern than the removal of opportunity to 
comment on evidence.270  However, there are also strong arguments for being able to extend 
time limits to enable the parties sufficient time to settle or to consider offers of settlement or, 
just as importantly in terms of due process protections, to permit parties to the necessary time 
to locate evidence or to ascertain their legal rights.271 
This remains a highly challenging issue.  One logical solution may be to have pre-determined 
institutional timescales, within which the parties must comply, but the arbitrator should 
perhaps have full authority, as is the case with most standard commercial arbitration 
institutional rules,272 to extend time limits where the facts specifically demand it.273  Some 
obvious situations where an extension might be necessary include when the parties’ 
languages are incompatible and there are translation needs; where the arbitrator serves a 
document request on a party; where both parties request a standstill to permit time for private 
negotiations; where there has been delays outside the parties’ control; where the dispute is 
clearly more complex; or where a party in good faith requests an extension in order to 
investigate their legal entitlements more closely.  Nevertheless, this authority to extend 
should be narrowly defined and solely reside within the arbitrator’s autonomy, thus – given 
the overriding objective of expediency and that time limits have been pre-determined ‘by the 
parties’ in the case of non-extension – a party should not be able to complain that their due 
process rights have been breached simply by an arbitrator not granting an extension.274  This 
is likely to be a contentious issue and one which must be carefully designed: on the one hand, 
the ability to extend time limits plays an imperative due process protection, and on the other, 
it risks the inclusion of dilatory tactics, such as those commonplace in commercial 
arbitration.275  Therefore, arbitrators would need to be vigorously trained and to observe a 
clearly laid-out set of guidelines on granting or refusing extensions. 
c) Document Disclosure  
The role of document disclosure is perhaps one of the more intriguing questions facing 
international low-value arbitration.  Document discovery, particularly in common law 
jurisdictions, is regarded as a valuable “party equalising” procedure: by parties laying all the 
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available information on the table it provides a fuller account to the trier of fact and, equally, 
providers weaker parties with a much fairer opportunity to bring their claims against stronger 
parties who hold more information at their disposal and might be withholding adverse 
evidence.276  Document disclosure has played an increasing role in international commercial 
arbitration.277  However, it is also one of the principal features “which contributes most to the 
time and costs explosion.”278  Given that discovery is well-known to cause excessive costs 
and timescales in commercial arbitration,279 it seems an unlikely candidate for low-value 
consumer arbitration.280  This has perhaps more of an impact on those familiar with common 
law style procedures281 given that, as Risse says, civil law jurisdictions have managed 
perfectly well without “the truth on the table – concept” of Anglo-American cultures.282  
Certainly it would seem unreasonable to many civil lawyers that one could bring an action 
against someone in the hope that supporting evidence in the possession of the other party 
might come to light.283  Further, there is often no guarantee that companies will disclose all 
documents according to their instruction and rarely does document production generate that 
crucial document that heavily swings the determination of the case.284 
Nevertheless, there is a sound counter-argument that document production could play this 
vital party equalising role in consumer arbitration.285  Consumers or small-scale traders, being 
the weaker party and with less available information at their disposal, may be justified in 
asserting that certain internal company documents would support their arguments.  There is 
still a method, however, by which document discovery can play this vital role in fast and 
cheap arbitration.  Firstly, as was the case in the proposed UNCITRAL Rules and in the 
UDRP,286 arbitrators should be empowered to request certain specific documents from a 
party.287  Secondly, which is not a part of the UDRP288 but was anticipated within the 
UNCITRAL Rules,289 the arbitrator should be empowered to draw adverse inferences from 
any failure to produce requested documents.290 
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The arbitrator is therefore authorised, in essence, to reverse the burden of proof from the 
consumer to the merchant.291  This reversal of the burden of proof would also be in harmony 
with mandatory consumer protection law in many jurisdictions.292  Nevertheless, the last draft 
of the UNCITRAL Rules proposed that burden reversals should only done in “exceptional 
circumstances”.293  This therefore leaves us questioning what these ‘circumstances’ could 
have been.  Clearly, whenever procedural rules for international low-value arbitration are 
eventually designed, such circumstances will need to be expounded further.  Document 
requests themselves should really be carefully controlled and their rules carefully defined.  
For example, the types of document requests the arbitrator can make should be specific and 
narrow, so as not to call for extensive “judicialized” disclosure practices294 or to promote 
overly optimistic requests.295  Furthermore, requests should be based on justified beliefs that 
such adverse documents exist and are relatively accessible:296 it would thus remain a relative 
burden on the consumer to argue the justification (or legality - if contained within mandatory 
law) for such requests.  Arbitrators will also therefore need to be thoroughly trained in the use 
of burden reversals and document disclosure.297  As a natural consequence, where a 
document is requested by an arbitrator, there should also be the flexibility for consequent 
extension of time limits to enable the respondent party to supply the documents.  This has 
been a significant criticism of the UDRP, where arbitrators are able to request documents, but 
given their strict 14-day time limit from appointment to make an award, such requests are 
virtually never made.298  This system of proof burden reversals therefore needs much further 
refinement and will hopefully be accompanied with clear guidance on its role.  
d) Documents-Only Arbitration 
It seems well accepted now, especially in the light of common fast-track rules, that the parties 
are capable of conducting “documents-only” arbitration, ie where there is no oral hearing or 
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examination of oral evidence.299  These practices are accepted as a method for keeping costs 
and timescales minimised.  Furthermore, documents-only arbitration is suited to claims where 
relatively simple fact determinations need to be made.300  Given the likely demarcation of 
types of claim within mandatory consumer arbitration, it is likely that the simple types of 
claim with which we are dealing are entirely suited to documents-only arbitrations.301  There 
are two challenging aspects however.  Firstly, national arbitration legislation seems to vary 
on the right of parties to call for a hearing, although in most jurisdictions it tends to be a 
waivable right.302  The UNCITRAL Model Law only permits a prior agreement to dispense 
with hearings (such as contained in the ODR provider’s standard rules) to be altered on 
agreement of both parties.303  In the avoidance of driving up costs and dilatory tactics against 
weaker parties, this system would be preferable also in the ODR context and should be the 
standard under ODR provider rules.304 
The second concern is a due process issue with documents-only procedure generally.  Many 
would argue, especially those of a common law predisposition,305 that oral testimony of 
parties and witnesses provides a fundamental truth-seeking role in adjudicatory 
proceedings.306  It is certainly more challenging to evaluate the veracity of evidence through 
the production of only written materials.307  This might be seen as an issue when one 
considers that the consumer or small-scale trader will often bear the burden of proof and any 
‘tie’ in terms of the weight of the written evidence could go in favour of the seller.308  
Nevertheless, given the severely limited role for truth-seeking within consumer arbitration as 
well as the possibility of proof burden reversing, it seems unlikely that online hearings, such 
as through videoconferencing,309 would become the norm.310  Although, this would naturally 
depend on the value of the claim. 
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It is a commonly accepted due process principle that where an arbitrator is to inspect 
evidence they should do this in the presence of both parties, enabling the parties to guide and 
comment during the inspection.  Perhaps in this instance it might also be advisable that such 
processes are conducted through some form of live videoconferencing technology with all 
parties present.  The last draft of the UNCITRAL Rules operated solely under documents-
only procedure and the EU Directive simply states at Article 9(1)(a) “the parties [should] 
have the possibility, within a reasonable period of time, of expressing their point of view, of 
being provided by the ADR entity with the arguments, evidence, documents and facts put 
forward by the other party, any statements made and opinions given by experts, and of being 
able to comment on them.” 
Essentially this reinforces the point that more important than the right to an oral hearing is 
providing the parties with sufficient opportunity to comment and respond to all evidence 
raised during proceedings.  In terms of procedural structure, it is likely that online consumer 
arbitration will work by front-loading,311 ie by ensuring that the initial statement of claim and 
response to claim contain the fullest account within a reasonable word limit312 and including 
any evidence such as written witness statements in an accompanying annex.  This front-
loading will help the arbitrators to properly identify the issues of the dispute at an early stage 
and may also encourage settlements between the parties as they become fully aware of each 
side’s position.313  Following this, the appointed arbitrator should be able to request any 
further documents or to reverse any proof burdens.  Finally, the parties should have at least 
one more opportunity to comment on all evidence raised before any final determinations are 
made.314   
The use of written witness and expert statements is increasingly common in international 
arbitration,315 especially within fast-track rules.  For example, the European Court of 
Arbitration requests that witness statements are accompanied by a ‘Statement of Truth’ and 
provide a warning against possible criminal sanctions for false statements.  Providing such a 
warning seems reasonable considering the diversity in perjury laws across jurisdictions that 
deal with witnesses providing false statements in arbitration,316 although ultimately it is left to 
the tribunal to decide the veracity of any evidence.317  Given the limited role for cross-
examination in consumer arbitration, therefore, this demonstrates a further move away from 
common law styles of adjudication.  Another key transition would be the fact that the neutral 
is likely to be more inquisitorial and to take a more active role in the procedure than the 
parties themselves.318  This might include, for example, the appointment of any 3rd party 
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witnesses or information providers (following agreement from the parties), who would likely 
be appointed and questioned by the neutral and not by the parties themselves.319  
e) Fees & Funding 
Naturally, given the pre-occupation with maintaining extremely low costs in consumer low-
value arbitration, the question about how any scheme is to be funded poses a dilemma.  A key 
question is whether the merchants who opt into an online arbitration scheme should be 
required to pay more towards the arbitration than their customers.320  Certainly in the United 
States, the common law doctrine of unconscionability operates to negate mandatory 
arbitration where the fees to the consumer are clearly unreasonable in contrast to the value of 
the claim or the cost of pursuing a similar claim in the courts.321  Similarly, the EU Directive 
requires that ADR procedures are “free of charge or available at a nominal fee for 
consumers”.322  This presents a real problem in ODR, however, for it is the merchants who 
currently must be convinced to sign up to an ODR procedure in the knowledge that the 
consumer has no alternative means of redress.  Nominal fee arrangements can and do make 
sense in domestic ADR context, where the alternative of small claims litigation is a 
significant reality.323  Nevertheless, in order to convince merchants to willingly adopt low-
value cross-border ADR processes, there may be a strong argument for a fairer and more 
equal fee structure, backed by a due process safeguard against excessive fees for the 
consumer or against fee structures which in any way prevent the consumer bringing their 
claim.324   
Some authors promote the idea of utilising government funding, as well as a role for not-for-
profit organisations as ADR entities,325 although this might be difficult to achieve considering 
the costs and potential demand for services.326  Just as it has been in all other areas of ADR, 
be it domestic or international, there seems no reason why a competitive market of private 
entities should not be able to deliver a fair and affordable procedure, while still providing 
opportunities for public, semi-private and not-for-profit entities to also compete for services.  
Also, it is worth noting that the fees will likely be a set figure based on the value of claim, 
and will not be based on hourly rates or other factors, where they exceed the expectations of 
the parties.327  Nevertheless, ODR providers will likely include terms to incur additional fees 
when further procedural processes are agreed by both parties, such as a video-conferenced 
hearing, a 3-party tribunal or appointment of an expert.  The role of cost awards or fee-
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shifting, and whether they could operate to reduce the fees for the successful party, may also 
be a matter of institutional variety,328 although cost awards should perhaps enable a claimant 
to pay an uncooperative respondent’s filing fee upfront and later reclaim it.329 
f) Applicable Law & Seat 
It has already been mentioned that arbitrators are likely to decide ex aequo et bono under 
many procedural rules.330  Further, that mandatory consumer protection law should play some 
role within international low-value consumer arbitration given that such rules are 
intentionally devised to protect the interests of consumers as weaker parties to any 
contractual bargain and ensuring that protection is transposed into the transnational context as 
far as practicable.331  In addition, the academic opinion that transnational legal rules should 
be applied within low-value consumer arbitration also attracts wide subscription.332  Perhaps 
even leading to a new form of lex mercatoria, known as the lex informatica, wherein 
common principles and usages could become recognised.  This “transnationalism would 
increase the fairness of the system, by making it more predictable, less costly, thus more 
workable and providing greater access.”333  Given the likely demarcation of claim types, it 
may therefore become common to observe institutional rules invoking transnational 
principles, such as the Lando Principles,334 and thereby avoiding complex questions of 
applicable law, as well as the imposed pre-selection of laws by a stronger party on to a 
weaker party.335  Furthermore, by applying laws reached by sufficient unanimity amongst the 
international community, this prevents the inconsistency and unpredictability that could come 
from empowering inexperienced arbitrators to freely create their own principles of law,336  
which has been another key criticism which has been made of the UDRP.337  Developing 
common norms, however, might require a higher burden on ODR providers to publish details 
of their awards (see Transparency below). 
It is well-known that the applicable seat which provides the governing arbitration law in 
international arbitration is nowadays something of a “fiction”, where arbitrations rarely 
actually take place within the geographical boundaries of the applicable seat.338  Given the 
delocalised nature of cyberspace, this detachment from physical location and the resulting 
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independence of parties to creatively select governing laws, is even more intensified.339  
Parties in commercial arbitration usually determine the seat in the arbitration agreement, 
failing party agreement it falls to be determined by the arbitrators.340  However, 
acknowledging the party equalising role that due process protection should take in 
international low-value arbitration, it would be reasonable to expect that merchants should 
not be able to pre-select the governing law of the arbitration, as this could empower them to 
select rules of governing law unfavourable to the consumer or weaker party.341  de Witt has 
suggested implementing asymmetric jurisdictional rules, so that the consumer’s domicile is 
routinely the place of arbitration.342  Arguably this does give the consumer easier access to 
take an action for set-aside.343  However, it could create complex and time-consuming 
definitional challenges for arbitrators.  Some commentators go even further and suggest that 
online arbitration be completely transnational and free of any curial law,344 although this 
creates uncertainty in terms of enforcement and recognition given the lack of ‘awarding’ 
state.345  Providing the arbitrator with authority to decide, depending on the case 
circumstances, could also create unpredictability, extend timescales and risks perceptions of 
bias.  An alternative may be based on reciprocity between states so that only when the elected 
place of arbitration subscribes to the same standardised set of procedural laws governing 
international consumer arbitration can resulting awards become enforceable.   
g) Transparency 
Given that the UNCITRAL Guidelines were hastily negotiated as the clock was running 
down, their effort to address the important issue of arbitration procedural transparency left 
many gaps and uncertainties.  For example, they required vendors simply to disclose the 
details of their contractual relationship with their ODR provider, but did not give any detail 
on the types of information that should be included.346  Does this mean merely disclosing the 
existence of the contractual relationship?  Or does it go further and include matters such as 
the monetary value of the contract.  Or, notice of any modified procedural rules that favour 
the vendor?  Or, the number of awards that the ODR provider has given in favour or against 
vendors?  There were two other transparency rules contained in the UNCITRAL Rules.  
However, one is non-obligatory (“the vendor may wish to publish anonymized data”)347 and 
the other is a hortatory recommendation which provides very little (“All relevant information 
should be available on the ODR administrator’s website…”).348 
By contrast, Article 7 of the EU Directive provides a fair level of detail on the level of 
transparency required by consumer ADR entities in the EU.349  The EU transparency rules 
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include publication of annual statistical data relating to the types of claims received, the 
average time taken to resolve disputes and the rate of compliance, along with details 
including the entities’ fees, costs, procedural rules, available languages and information about 
their neutrals.350  Accessibility to internal information of ODR providers not only provides 
vital empirical data to the relevant legislatures and governmental bodies, but further it 
provides a far fairer system of ODR for the parties: by the parties being able to access the 
procedural provisions, training processes, previous awards, fee structures and other statistical 
data of existing ODR providers, they are likely to have a better understanding of the merits of 
their case and of using various providers, leading to higher settlement rates and further 
removing repeat player advantages for stronger parties.351   
Certainly, the publication of decisions rendered under the UDRP has been a successful and 
commendable practice.352  Nevertheless, there is still a balancing act to be done: to expect 
ODR providers to publish details on every award (with party names removed) might be 
unrealistic given the potential case volumes.  Furthermore, many might argue for upholding 
arbitration’s confidential nature.353  Certainly there is a feeling that important decisions made 
through consumer arbitration should be made public and shared with consumer protection 
agencies, to keep consumers informed and to prevent wide trading misconduct.354  Currently 
the EU Directive only requires ODR providers to report “any systematic or significant 
problems that occur frequently… in order to raise traders’ standards and to facilitate the 
exchange of information and best practices.”355  Whether this has struck a fair balance 
between confidentiality and maintaining transparency remains to be seen.   However, there is 
one vital rule that could be said to be missing from the Directive.  Unlike in commercial 
arbitration,356 consumer and low-value ODR providers should be required to be fully 
transparent in their appointments process and how they recommend neutrals to each claim.357  
Currently, the EU Directive Article 7(c) requires providers to publish “the natural persons in 
charge of ADR, the method of their appointment and the length of their mandate”. But it does 
not seem as though the term ‘method of appointment’ sufficiently covers the methodology by 
which neutrals are assigned individual cases. 
h) Other Due Process Issues 
The utility, feasibility and enforceability of US style class actions in general international 
arbitration, wherein groups of ‘smaller parties’ can joinder into the arbitration as a single 
party, still remains unresolved.358  The advantages of class actions to weaker parties such as 
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consumers are obvious, for they enable parties to collectively amass enough finance to bring 
a more forceful action against larger corporations and avoid multiple cases where only a 
single case would suffice.359  Nevertheless, despite their potential advantages, it appears 
unlikely that class actions will be a feature of international online consumer arbitration.  
Firstly, forming a collective action by bringing together a vast group of geographically 
diverse e-consumers would be incredibly difficult, almost impossible, task.  Secondly, the 
very goal of ODR procedure design is to ensure that smaller parties can bring fair and 
successful actions against larger parties without the need for collective financial resource.  
Finally, the narrow demarcation of the types of claim which are eligible to mandatory online 
procedure will mean that the only types of claim will be low-value and low-complexity.  
There is a general expectation that the process should be simple enough that parties will not 
need legal representation, but that if they do wish to, they should be permitted to appoint 
anyone including non-legally qualified persons.360  Some debate has centred on the proper 
form of award in international consumer arbitration.  Even if the New York Convention 
remains the primary instrument for cross-border enforcement, it is likely that courts could 
purposively interpret the “authenticated original or certified copy” requirement to include 
digitised awards and signatures contained in emails.361  Similarly, the EU Directive only 
requires that awards are available on a “durable medium”,362 which would include email-
based awards.363  It also seems possible that basic award reasoning will become standard 
practice.364  Not only would it increase the chances of enforcement, but it would assist in 
raising levels of voluntary compliance and would further serve to quell any perceptions of 
bias or unfairness in the procedure.365 
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The correct form of arbitration agreement in online transactions will be a matter for later 
debate.366  The EU Directive requires that where consumers agree to enter into arbitration 
post-dispute, that they are informed of its binding nature and that it would remove their 
freedom to pursue court action, and “specifically accept this”.367  However, if certain types of 
narrow pre-dispute arbitration agreements were ever to become binding on small-scale 
traders and consumers in the EU, then some might argue for a requirement that such 
consumers specifically and separately agree to the terms of the arbitration agreement at the 
point of sale, separate to the merchant’s standard terms.368  For example, consumer arbitration 
agreements in Germany must be contained in a separate document that is signed by the 
consumer.369  Similarly, in the US, the AAA Due Process Protocol recommends that 
consumers should also have “clear and adequate notice”, but accepts relative flexibility 
depending on the type of contract negotiation (eg standard-term compared with face-to-
face).370  Whether the practice of providing an additional stage in a website’s buying process, 
informing consumers of an arbitration agreement, would be widely adopted by e-merchants 
across the EU may be doubtful.371  This further casts uncertainty on whether mandatory 
arbitration can ever be possible in the EU and, accordingly, whether such a consumer ODR 
framework could ever become fully-fledged.   
VI. Conclusion 
It has become apparent throughout the research conducted in this paper that providing firm 
answers to the questions of due process within international online consumer arbitration is an 
almighty task.  It is such a vast and unpredictable area of transnational legal development that 
it will only create many academic debates in the decades to come.  In the meantime, it seems 
only possible to provide conjectural discussion on what may or may not become important 
due process debates in the future, once fully-fledged regional and international low-value 
dispute resolution frameworks are in place – indeed if they ever can be.  The direction taken 
by UNCITRAL in their final few sessions was instead to focus on the other option, raised in 
Section III, of non-legally binding ODR processes but which are virtually enforced via 
private online enforcement mechanisms.372  The development of effective online enforcement 
mechanisms therefore, and how these will be meta-governed on a transnational basis by 
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public regulators, is another key question for future research.373  While it appears likely that 
intermediaries (payment providers and credit and debit card providers) and websites (eg 
eBay, Amazon, Facebook) will play an ever-increasing role in managing small-scale 
consumer disputes, for those growing millions of cross-border claims outside of this, which 
are also too small in value and complexity to be suited to standard international arbitration 
providers (eg below €10,000), there is now a pressing need for a cheap, expedient and 
efficient online solution.  Hopefully this paper has provided useful predictions and 
perspectives on the likely procedural rules and fairness requirements within the future online 
arbitration industry. 
There are several other due process issues which are relevant in the context of low-value 
arbitration, but which were beyond the restricted scope of this paper, for example the serving 
of proper notice,374 the language of proceedings375 and the potential role of appeals & judicial 
review.376  However, the research conducted here has hopefully consolidated some of the key 
issues in the debate and has provided, in some instances, useful recommendations to guide 
the development of international low-value arbitration.  These findings can be summarised as 
follows: 
 Due process as enforced under traditional commercial arbitration relies too much on the 
operation of party autonomy and the freedom of parties to invoke or remove due process 
principles through private negotiation.  This would not be satisfactory in the context of 
consumer and low-value arbitration given the significant inequality of bargaining power 
between parties and the likely freedom of stronger corporations to invoke unfair 
procedural rules in standard terms. 
 The impending EU ODR scheme, with its Principle of Liberty and the right of parties in 
consumer contracts to opt for court processes when already tied to an arbitration 
agreement, is unlikely to deliver a viable solution to the currently low take-up of ODR.  
Both parties must be compelled into arbitration otherwise either party will be at liberty to 
avoid resolution processes altogether given the lack of any alternative redress. 
 Unless the EU can find a way to asymmetrically compel merchants into binding ODR 
processes without significant costs to the economy, new legislation may be needed to 
control consumer arbitration transnationally.  This will provide higher due process 
protections than the New York Convention and, through such due process protections, 
will permit certain ‘simple’ types of claim arising from consumer contracts to be 
mandatorily subject to new arbitration laws. 
 Parties within the new arbitration scheme will have to accept a severely diminished role 
of “truth-seeking” within any arbitration, given the overpowering objectives of speed and 
affordability.  Nevertheless, due process principles should operate to provide an equal 
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procedure between the parties and to avoid any repeat player advantages accruing to more 
powerful parties. 
 There is likely to be the imposition of relatively strict time limits within the scheme, with 
sufficient flexibility for the arbitrator extend time limits dependant on clearly defined 
circumstances. 
 Both consumer and merchant should be provided with an “equal voice” not only in the 
appointment of arbitrators to hear their claims, but also in the appointment of the ODR 
provider.  Furthermore, merchants should not be at liberty to have unilateral controls over 
the procedure, applicable law and seat of arbitration. 
 There is likely to be a diminished role for document disclosure.  However, through the 
operation of proof burden reversing and specific document requests, there will still be still 
be a supporting role for document disclosure in providing some consumer protection. 
 Parties will primarily operate under “documents-only” procedure, utilising personal 
statements, witness statements and inspection of goods as common means of evidence. 
 On the whole, it is likely that a majority of decisions will be decided ex aequo et bono, 
given the constraints on time and costs.  It remains uncertain the extent to which 
mandatory consumer protection laws will operate within such a scheme, although it 
seems likely that they will be included to the furthest extent practicable.   
 ODR providers will need to be heavily transparent, providing regular publications on 
their rules, practices and training procedures, plus providing statistical data relevant to the 
types of claims they hear, the resulting awards and their fees.  Further, they should be 
compelled to be completely transparent in how they recommend neutrals to each claim.  
However, whether they will be expected to publish every award remains uncertain.   
More than anything the research in this paper has highlighted the almost insurmountable 
difficulty of the task ahead.  It perfectly demonstrates some of the key reasons why, even in 
the light of two decades of concerted effort by international and regional institutions, we are 
still a very long way from the vision of an international ultra-low-value arbitration 
framework.  Indeed, it even sheds doubt on whether we will ever be able to build such a 
system, given the ever-conflicting objectives of truth-seeking, time and costs.  Without 
extensive truth-seeking procedures, any adjudicatory process is likely to be viewed as unfair - 
yet there seems to be no alternative.  Perhaps our only choice remains “rough justice – or no 
justice.”377 
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